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 I 
Resumo 
A realidade bolsista a que hoje assistimos é distinta daquela presenciada noutros tempos. 
Hoje, resultantes de inúmeros factores, dos quais enalteço o crescimento da concorrência, as 
bolsas de valores já não são estruturadas como entidades cooperativas. Presentemente, as 
bolsas são empresas que procuram e lucro e cujo capital é detido por accionistas. Esta nova 
estrutura veio como consequência do processo de desmutualização. Este processo mais não é 
que a introdução de um agente que maximiza valor. Há a introdução de um órgão governativo 
dentro da bolsa, assim como uma separação dos direitos de membros e accionistas. Desde a 
última década do século passado, o mundo económico tem presenciado um forte crescimento 
do processo de desmutualização, pelo que, intrigado, tentei analisar o cerne da questão e os 
seus benefícios. Para examinar, escolhi analisar quatro bolsas de realidades distintas: duas 
entidades Europeias, uma bolsa Norte Americana e outra Asiática. Após a análise, concluí que 
esta mudança de estrutura é promotora de valor, uma vez que, após a desmutualização, as 
receitas crescem, os custos tornam-se eficientes e, na generalidade, há um melhor 
desempenho geral de cada bolsa. Concluí também, que o efeito concorrência é negativo para o 
número de empresas listadas em cada bolsa. Contudo, após a desmutualização, esta tendência 
inverte-se. Outra das minhas conclusões prende-se com o facto de haver uma relação positiva 
entre melhores desempenhos da bolsa e maior volume the accionistas. Por último, concluí que 
o processo de desmutualização está também ligado a associações e aquisições entre bolsas. 
 
Palavras – chave: Concorrência, Desmutualização, Valor, Desempenho  
 
Classificações JEL: G15, N20 
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Summary 
The stock exchange reality of today is very different to that one our ancestors experienced. 
Today, due to a variety of reasons, such as competitive pressures, stock exchanges are no 
longer structured as cooperative venues. Instead, today, trading venues are for-profit 
enterprises, whose capital is detained by external ownership. This new structure is a result of 
demutualization. Demutualization consists of the introduction of a residual claimant into the 
exchange – which maximizes the venues’ value. Furthermore, demutualization is aligned with 
a structure change, which brings into the exchange a governing board and a separation of 
ownership and membership rights. Due to an exponential growth of this structure change in 
the mid 1990s, I was intrigued and, consequently, analysed the benefits of demutualization. 
Through an analysis of four distinct exchanges: two from Europe, one from North America 
and one from Asia, I objectively analyse a set of financial and volume indicators, and the 
evolution of ownership. Through this analysis, I conclude that demutualization is value-
enhancing, in the sense that revenues increase, costs become efficient, and the overall 
performances of the sample exchanges seemingly improve. Moreover, I conclude that 
competitive pressures tend to reduce the volumes of listed companies in the exchange and, 
given demutualization, the trend is reversed. Through the analyses of the structure of 
ownership, I positively correlate the growth of the shareholder base to improved 
performances. Lastly, I link demutualization with mergers and acquisitions. 
 
Key-words: Competition, Demutualization, Value-Enhancement, Performance 
 
JEL Classification: G15, N20 
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Sumário Executivo 
A desmutualização, no seu contexto das bolsas de valores mundiais, os seus motivos e os seus 
efeitos, é um tema ainda pouco explorado, apesar de já existir alguma literatura sobre o tema. 
É meu objectivo, através desta tese, analisar um conjunto de principais bolsas de valores e 
avaliar o que de facto levou à desmutualização das mesmas e quais os efeitos posteriores e os 
benefícios alavancados por este fenómeno.  
 
De acordo com evidência histórica, as actividades bolsistas surgem no século 14, em formas 
mais rudimentares, onde os seus intervenientes procediam à compra e venda de dívidas 
bancárias. As necessidades dos investidores, bem como o crescente volume de oportunidades 
de negócio terão sido os factores influenciadores para a criação dos mesmos, enquanto outros 
motivos, tais como custos de operação reduzidos, terão sido o motivo para a sua manutenção 
neste formato de cooperativa. Em termos históricos, a primeira bolsa a ser oficialmente 
estabelecida foi a de Amesterdão, no século XVII, data a partir da qual assistimos à criação de 
mercados de bolsas baseados no modelo de cooperativas cujas operações eram, 
essencialmente, a compra e venda de dívidas bancárias, evoluindo mais tarde para mercados 
de acções, títulos bancários, entre outros instrumentos financeiros. Este modelo tinha como 
princípios base o elemento não lucrativo e a igualdade de votos entre os seus membros, e era 
mantido a nível local por uma regulamentação protectora, que por sua vez promovia o 
carácter monopolista de cada bolsa, onde os interesses individuais não permitiam maximizar 
os interesses comuns.  
 
Este modelo de cooperativa e os seus princípios base mantiveram-se relativamente inalterados 
até ao século XX, altura em que as próprias economias mundiais começam a sofrer alterações 
para se adaptarem a uma era de expansão e, naturalmente, exigindo novas estruturas e 
modelos de negócio. Neste contexto a regulamentação altera, globalizando e alargando o 
espaço de actuação das bolsas locais, e introduzindo assim o efeito de concorrência nestes 
mercados. Surgem então os modelos de bolsas de valores conforme os conhecemos 
actualmente, separando os direitos de propriedade, retirando poder aos membros e 
introduzindo novos elementos na sua estrutura: um órgão gestor e decisor, com fins lucrativos 
e focado em potenciar o valor global da bolsa de valores. Ao mesmo tempo, a estrutura 
accionista das bolsas passou a integrar alguns clientes, garantindo assim um nível mínimo de 
operações para o seu futuro. 
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Estes novos modelos sofrem também uma alteração muito influenciadora no seu futuro: a 
introdução do factor tecnológico. Ao surgirem as redes de comunicação electrónica, verifica-
se uma evolução exponencial na velocidade das transacções, devido aos efeitos de 
proximidade que as comunicações proporcionam, acompanhada de uma forte redução de 
custos das mesmas. Estes avanços tecnológicos verificados nos anos 90 foram catalisadores 
das reformas legislatórias e regulamentares. A desmutualização das bolsas de valores é 
considerada assim uma reposta à competitividade introduzida pelas redes de comunicação 
electrónicas e alterações na legislação dos mercados financeiros. Na sua generalidade, este 
movimento é percebido como sendo benéfico para o mercado em si, pelo aumento no fluxo e 
volume de transacções, que por sua vez aumentam as receitas.    
 
Na compreensão dos motivos que induziram a desmutualização das bolsas de valores, 
considero que as redes de comunicações electrónicas foram o catalisador desta alteração 
estrutural das mesmas. No entanto, mais do que a concorrência que foi integrada nestes 
mercados tradicionalmente monopolistas, o que levou de facto à desmutualização foi um 
factor inerente a cada bolsa: a capacidade de enfrentar esta concorrência. Na sua maioria, as 
bolsas de valores não tiveram outra opção senão proceder à desmutualização de forma a 
prosseguir estratégias de benefício comum. Em 2004, nove dos dez principais players do 
mercado mundial tinham finalizado o processo de desmutualização, restando apenas a NYSE 
que conseguiu manter a sua estrutura tradicional até 2003. E, em conformidade com 
literaturas distintas, conseguiu adiar o processo porque teve a capacidade de se reestruturar 
internamente e criar estratégias inovadoras para fazer face à nova realidade.  
 
A análise dos efeitos e os benefícios resultantes do processo de desmutualização avalia a 
correlação entre este último e a performance de quatro principais bolsas de valores, a de Hong 
Kong (HKSE), a de Londres (LSE), de Atenas (ATHEX) e a de Nova Iorque (NYSE).  
 
Concluo que, na generalidade, em períodos subsequentes à desmutualização a eficiência das 
bolsas aumenta consideravelmente – constata-se um aumento nas receitas e uma redução nos 
custos operacionais. Verifica-se um aumento no rácio da margem operacional, o que 
comprova que estas bolsas tornam-se mais eficientes após a desmutualização. Apesar de ter 
inicialmente previsto uma queda no RoE, derivado de um maior crescimento dos capitais 
próprios em comparação com as receitas, o RoE aumenta em todos os casos, o que implica 
naturalmente uma optimização na performance das bolsas.  
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Em três dos quatro casos de referência, ocorre uma associação entre duas bolsas de valores no 
momento da desmutualização, o que para mim é indicativo de um futuro processo de 
aquisição, algo compreensível do ponto de vista de aumento de receitas e valor. 
 
Para além dos efeitos e benefícios da desmutualização, tive oportunidade de avaliar um 
indicador adicional e concluir que existe também uma correlação entre a dimensão da 
estrutura accionista e a performance operacional destas bolsas. Uma estrutura accionista 
maior implica que o poder individual se encontra mais diluído e assim são adoptadas 
estratégias de bem comum, e não individual, que resultam numa operação mais eficiente.  
 
De facto verifica-se que a desmutualização aumenta o valor de uma bolsa mas não resolve os 
seus problemas financeiros de base, conforme comprovado no caso da ATHEX onde após a 
desmutualização a bolsa regista um resultado líquido negativo. 
 
Acredito que a minha tese poderá no futuro não só incorporar a mesma análise sobre um 
conjunto maior de casos de referência para maior sustentação dos argumentos, como também 
introduzir novos eixos de análise tais como concorrência e aquisições.   
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1. Introduction 
The evolution of the globe has dictated the evolutional aspects of trade. Today, we experience 
a more competitive economy, where agility and efficiency are core elements of any successful 
business. As a result, in the past decades, the stock exchange reality has experienced 
tumultuous changes. Stock exchanges, which traditionally were structured as cooperative, 
non-profit enterprises, are now owned by private capitals and, contrarily, seek profits. This 
structure change is denominated as Demutualization2. The Stockholm Stock Exchange was 
the first to demutualize, in 1993, constituting, at the time, the uniquely demutualized 
exchange in the world. Today, the ten largest exchanges in the world have demutualized and 
gone public (Exhibit A), indicating the scale of the phenomenon. 
 
Given that this trend is very recent, there is very limited literature on the matter. Furthermore, 
there is a need to complement the results and analysis of previous investigations, since the 
first demutualization dates back to 1993, and thus, the availability of more data enriches the 
analysis. My motivations for the present investigation are clearly associated to the intriguing 
tendency of demutualization, and the limited literature concerning this trend. 
 
The intent of my thesis is to analyse the benefits of demutualization. It is a fact that exchanges 
have demutualized, but the question is: why? What are its benefits? To test for this matter, I 
attempt to be the most objective possible, selecting a number of sample exchanges which 
operate in distinct realities. I apply the analysis to a set of four sample exchanges: two from 
Europe, one from North America and the other, from Asia. My thesis is innovative in the 
sense that it is one of the first researches that analyses the demutualization of the New York 
Stock Exchange. Moreover, given the stress which financial markets are now subjected to, 
due to the global economic crisis, I come to think the results of my investigation may be 
revealing.    
 
Stock exchanges are undoubtedly important for the equilibrium of the financial system. They 
are a source of capital for all the listed firms and a form of investment for stakeholders, since 
they offer a wide variety of liquidity, especially with the modern electronic venues, which 
automatically match buy and sell orders. Consequently, enterprises may find a source of 
                                                 
2
 “Separation of ownership and membership” (Ramos, 2006b; 3) 
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finance in stock exchanges, in the sense that the latter enable an enterprise to finance itself, 
wholly or partially, through the process of share trade.3 Accordingly, Levine and Zervos 
(1998) conclude that the banking and stock market industry provide important services for 
economic development.   
 
Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) are unequivocally one of the catalysts for the 
evolution of stock exchanges, bringing increased competition into the market. The other 
trigger for this evolution of stock exchanges was the elimination of regulatory barriers. 
Today, firms, once confined to national exchanges, can list themselves abroad. This openness 
is beneficial for many stakeholders, although not for the venue itself. Notice that before the 
regulatory changes, exchanges were promptly enjoying the financial benefits of a monopoly 
position. Furthermore, the members of these venues were too enjoying these monopolies, 
once this market positioning was assuring the cashy revenues for all of the operations of the 
exchange. 
 
However, the environment changed and competition was materialized. Technological, low-
cost exchanges came to foster competition for the traditional exchanges. Additionally, the 
traditional exchanges were not able to compete with new and agile venues, given that they 
had never experienced competition. As discussed by Aggarwal (2002), conventional 
cooperative exchanges did not have the agility and financial flexibility to exhaustively 
compete with the new trading venues. Furthermore, exchanges were unanimously structured 
as cooperative structures, which today present more costs than benefits.  
 
The solution for the problem came in the mid 1990s, with the so-called demutualization 
process. Demutualization, which is the fragmentation of ownership and membership rights, 
implies a radical structure change: stock exchanges become for-profit enterprises with outside 
ownership. This structure change consists of the introduction of a governing body, which 
comes to maximize the venues’ value – residual claimant4. As a result, the traditional 
members of the mutually owned exchanges could no longer apply their self-interest policies 
into the exchange. Hence, they continuously vetoed potential demutualizations.  
 
                                                 
3
 I indulge the importance of the securities’ market. 
4
 An agent “who would provide the right incentives to maximize exchange value as opposed to the members’ 
individual profits” (Hazarika, 2005: 4). 
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However, due to a set of reasons, such as member heterogeneity and erosion of revenues, 
stock exchanges gradually converted into for-profit trading venues. The reasons for setting the 
business as a cooperative are numerous and varied, and we will discuss them, in the sense 
that, to fully understand demutualization, we first need to understand the traditional structure. 
 
In line with the findings of Mendiola and O’Hara (2003), I conclude that demutualization is 
value-enhancing. Value enhancement can be acknowledged and tested in distinct ways; 
nevertheless, I look at the evolution of revenues, cost-efficiencies, volume-enhancement, and 
others. Moreover, I conclude that competition is eroding the exchanges’ revenues, once the 
numbers of listed companies, in the sample exchanges, are decreasing in the moments prior to 
demutualization, as discussed by Hazarika (2005). On the other hand, I provide evidence that 
demutualization is not the solution for financially based problems. Demutualization comes to 
promote value, not to solve base problems. 
 
I find that the improving performances of exchanges are positively related to a wider number 
of outside shareholders, since they manage to dilute the power of the predecessor members. A 
larger number of outside shareholders dilute the predecessor members’ power, inhibiting the 
capacity of the latter to influence and implement self-interest policies into the exchange. 
 
Lastly, I analyse the relationship between demutualization and mergers, once three of the four 
sample exchanges seemingly merge with other trading venues at the time of the structure 
change. Additionally, after their IPO, two of the sample exchanges acquire or merge with 
other venues; in line with the value-maximization policies brought into the exchange with the 
introduction of the residual claimant. This argument is also presented in the conclusions of 
Ramos (2006b). 
 
The paper is structured in the following manner: section 2 essentially contextualizes the 
reader into the exchange reality, thoroughly explaining the motives for-cooperative and for-
outside-ownership. Section 3 is related to the explanation of the case and consequent 
formulation of the hypothesis. Section 4 is uniquely dedicated to the analysis of the results. 
Finally, section 5, is where I present my concluding observations. 
 
2. Corporate Governance of Stock Exchanges 
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2.1 Historical Evidence 
Trading affairs have been common through the history of mankind. However, the idea of 
something related to the so called stock exchanges of today, dates back to eleven hundred, 
when the French courtiers de change were busy managing the “debts of agricultural 
communities on behalf of the banks” (Wikipedia, 2008). These Frenchmen were trading the 
debts of the agricultural populations, and therefore, they are considered to be the first brokers. 
 
Nevertheless, the French courtiers de change are not theoretically considered the first players 
in the exchange industry. The first players were reported in Bruges, Belgium, in 1309, where 
several traders gathered at Van der Boerse’s house to promote the exchange of several titles, 
generally, bank debts, which is closer to the reality of our era. This novelty industry, at that 
time, engaged several benefits for the economic venues and so rapidly expanded through 
Europe. 
 
The Amsterdam Stock exchange, which dates back to 1602, was the first exchange to be 
officially established. However, at that time, there were already several ‘unofficial’ trading 
venues. Following Amsterdam, the world witnessed the emergence of several other stock 
exchanges, such as Paris and, later on, in the 18th century, the New York Stock Exchange. 
 
The convenience of the mechanism, in the sense that it presented multiple business 
opportunities, made it successful. At first, the bourses’ business objectives were related to the 
exchange of bank debts between traders, but gradually these objectives mutated. Later on in 
its history, the core business of the exchanges became the trade of stocks, issue and recovery 
of securities, financial instruments and other capital events, such as the payment of dividends 
and income.  
 
The exchanges’ structure, conversely, did not suffer many changes until the last decade of the 
20th century, where a boiling economy demanded for new exchange structures. Let’s say that, 
until the end of the nineteen hundreds, the stability of economies and a less globalized world 
promoted less competitiveness between exchanges and, therefore, the traditional cooperative 
structure was the optimal framework for stock exchanges. Due to historic and economic 
reasons, stock exchanges have been operated as cooperative venues, where members have 
equal voting rights and the organization is non-lucrative. Today, with the elimination of 
regulatory and trade barriers, and the materialization of competition, stock exchanges have 
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convincingly opted for other enterprise structures - structures which promote profits, through 
the introduction of a residual claimant and, thus, engaging order flow and volume. 
 
2.2 The conventional exchanges and their role until the end of the 20th century 
 “Traditionally, the stock exchange was primarily a physical location for trade. Trade was 
conducted in person and multiple securities were traded at the same location to maximise 
liquidity. (Hazarika, 2005: 2)” The core operations were strictly related to listing and 
membership fees, transactions, clearing and settlement services, and data dissemination. As 
the global economy evolved, the trade volumes experienced in exchanges were increasing at 
astonishing rates. Furthermore, the limited access to the trading floor - as a result of space 
constraints – enabled the members to impel higher brokerage commissions to the exchange 
users and a privileged view of the trading flow. This gave the stock exchange members 
market power and, consequently, they were able to extract monopoly rents from the venue. As 
a result of this phenomenon, more and more traders wanted to join the trading floor, but, in 
the majority of cases this was not possible, due to the high initial and annual fees to access the 
trading floor (Steil, 2002a). It is widely acknowledged that the greater the number of traders, 
the better the price discovery; which in turn motivated more brokers to join the trading venue 
(Lee, 1998). 
 
The reasons for the exchanges to work in the form of cooperatives are diverse; historically 
and economically. As presented earlier, the primary exchanges worked as associations, where 
numerous traders grouped to exchange debts. If we look closer at the history of the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE), we can clearly see that it started as a form of association; when 
various members of the Royal Exchange were expelled and, as a result, grouped at Jonathans’ 
Coffee Shop to exchange the debts they had in hand. Later on, in the beginning of the 19th 
century, the venue was officially established and regulated. More examples, such as the 
Amsterdam and Brussels stock exchanges, began as forms of associations which gradually 
established themselves as formal trading venues. Furthermore, throughout the 19th century, 
the law often obliged certain forms of enterprise, such as mutual insurance companies, to 
adopt a cooperative structure. However, the history of the structural formats of exchanges 
cannot alone explain why exchanges initially structured themselves as cooperative venues, 
especially due to the fact that similar enterprises – in a majority of cases, linked to the 
financial industry – opted for different forms of enterprise: outside ownership. In conclusion, 
the reasons for stock exchanges to form as cooperatives are purely economical and social. 
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Conventionally, stock exchanges were non-profit, quasi-governmental organizations. Hence, 
the members had to invest a portion of their profits for the venues’ infrastructure requirements 
– technology and facilities. Furthermore, unlike the scenario of the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), where the voting power of a member was a sum of the number of seats 
held, in most exchanges there was a one member one vote (OMOV) rule. In other words, in 
the common circumstances of a cooperative stock exchange, members could not sum up their 
seats to have more influence on the exchange – each member had one vote which was equal to 
the vote of any other member. Obviously, to agree upon a given issue, there needed to be a 
majority vote between the members. 
 
This form of enterprise had many advantages and disadvantages; however, until recent 
findings, the benefits surpassed the costs of organizing as a cooperative. The first argument in 
favour of cooperative exchanges is undoubtedly the minimization of contracting costs. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) put forward an exhaustive analysis that demonstrates how a 
member structure can easily minimize contracting costs. The reduction of contracting costs is 
attained through the process of offering membership, as opposed to employment. This means 
that instead of the exchange hiring employees for the venue itself, it offers membership to an 
individual who then has to pay a fee and contribute a percentage of his profits to the 
exchange. As a result, the exchange not only minimizes contracting costs, but it also manages 
to find a source of revenue – via the fees and percentage over members’ profits. In 
conclusion, the exchange was only the platform for change, as argued by Hazarika (2005). 
 
It is clear that all of these arguments are correct when the membership is homogeneous. As 
discussed before, since each member had one vote (independently of his weight in the 
exchange), there was an inevitable need for a homogeneous environment – members needed 
to be compatible with each other. In that case, as discussed by Hansman (1988), the 
minimization of contracting costs would be an advantage for the exchange. The advantage 
would rapidly turn to become a cost if the members’ interests were divergent; which is 
exactly what happened with the globalization of financial markets and co-existence of 
national and international traders in the same trading platforms. Take for example a large 
international bank and a small brokerage service firm where both could be members with the 
same voting rights. If each wants to maximise self profits, what happens is that the 
exchanges’ overall potential is not being maximised, in the sense that each member tries to 
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vote forth his own interests as opposed to the exchanges’ common interest. Clearly, this is 
costly for the exchange and, as we will see in section 2.3, it was one of the reasons for the 
equitization of exchanges. 
 
Due to the advantageous regulations and laws for stock exchanges, the venues were enjoying 
the benefits of detaining a monopoly position in the financial market. Hence, this central and 
privileged position enabled members to exploit its clients to the extent they wanted; there was 
no competition as, generally, there was only one exchange in each country. DiNoia (1998), 
leading on ideas from Hansman (1996), argues how members were exploiting the exchanges’ 
users, as a result of the monopoly position. Due to pressures from the users - who constantly 
threatened to leave the exchange, in response to the exploitation from members -, the 
cooperative structure proved again to be optimal; customers were also offered membership. 
As a consequence of this customer-member-owned venue, all the parties were then enabled to 
balance self interests. The members were still able to protect their specialized services and 
reputation, whilst the users were able to avoid exploitation by members. These arguments are 
found in the papers of Hansman (1996), DiNoia (1998) and Pirrong (1999); however, they 
advocate for the importance of a homogeneous membership. 
 
Hart and Moore (HM) (1996) also argue in favour of the mutual structure. They too restrict 
and condition benefits of a cooperative to the existence of homogeneity between members. 
HM’s paper sharply explores the decision-making aspect of the exchange. They argue that the 
choice of parties who act on the exchange and the types of operations carried out by the venue 
are exclusively assigned to the owners of the venue. Hence, they conclude that both the 
mutual and outside ownership structures are inefficient; but for different reasons. They state 
that the outside ownerships’ corporate governance is limited to the introduction of a residual 
claimant, who only wants to maximize the exchanges’ value as opposed to maximising 
members’ self profits. “Decision-making is focused on the marginal user - the analogy they 
draw upon is that one of the monopolist who inefficiently restricts supply to raise prices.” 5 
(Hazarika, 2005: 8) On the other hand, the mutual structure is inefficient too since “the views 
of the decisive voter are not necessarily those of the membership as a whole.” (Hazarika, 
2005: 8) Nevertheless, as HM agree that the membership of stock exchange is traditionally 
homogenous; the most adequate structure would then be the cooperative form of enterprise.  
                                                 
5
 Take the recent example of the ‘Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEP), who 
continuously restricts supply to raise the falling value of Petrol. 
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Another advantage of the mutual structure is the relationship-specific investments between 
the exchange and its users. Kongden (1998) and Macey and O’Hara (MOH) (1999) argue that 
the structure choice was related to the nature of the services provided by stock exchanges. 
MOH argued that only with a mutual structure is it possible to maximise the interests of both 
parties when planning relationship-specific investments. The operation consisted of a mutual 
investment; where the shares were provided by the customers and the services by the bourse. 
However, in the case of the structure not being a cooperative, each party could exploit the 
other, since they had “non-diversifiable investments in the relationship” (Mendiola and 
O’Hara, 2003: 5). Due to the possibility of exploitation, each party wanted to manage the 
exchange and, consequently, the best structure to reach the interests of both parties would 
inevitably be the cooperative form.  
 
Hart and Moore (HM) (1996), in line with the arguments of Kongden (1998) and MOH 
(1999), discuss that the “cooperative structure is optimal when concentrated ownership gives 
non-shareholder constituencies too few rents to make relationship-specific investments” 
(Mendiola and O’Hara, 2003: 4). In other words, they argue that opposed to the members’ self 
interests, in the case of the membership being homogeneous, there could be incentives to 
maximise the exchanges’ value – introducing a residual claimant whose purpose would be to 
introduce policies in favour of the stock exchanges’ interests as opposed to those of individual 
members. In the case of heterogeneity existing between members, HM argue that the most 
suitable structure would then be outside ownership, as I will later discuss in section 2.3. 
 
On another line, Pirrong (1999) demonstrates, through economic modelling, that member 
heterogeneity can be the factor that promotes a mutual structure. He reveals through his 
model that member heterogeneity, in terms of brokerage costs, is the factor that motivates 
low-cost members to enforce a cooperative structure. “The model shows how the low-cost 
members can enforce a mutual structure through the threat of leaving the exchange, if the 
high-cost members vote for a for-profit venue (which would redirect profits away from the 
low-cost members).” (Hazarika, 2005: 8) 
 
Despite all the preceding ideas, the fact is that today, a majority of the exchanges listed on the 
World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) are for-profit venues, with outside ownership and a 
governance board that exists to maximize the stock exchanges’ value. Accordingly, the 
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question that comes to mind is: why are exchanges around the globe undertaking new 
structures where ownership is separated from trading rights - demutualizing? 
 
 
Fig. 1 Governance type of the 50 largest Exchanges in the world. Source: Serifsoy and Tyrell, 2006 
 
2.3 Why are stock exchanges demutualizing? 
During the 1990’s, equity markets suffered tumultuous evolutions in the sense that it was an 
era of expansion. Business was revolutionized in numerous ways and trends were taking new 
directions. Take for example, the technological bubble that resulted from huge investor 
speculation; where intangible assets were highly overvalued in comparison to tangible assets. 
More specifically, look at the example were Yahoo was worth more than Boeing, a company 
whose assets are vast and tangible. 
 
Looking at stock exchanges - whose performance depends of its listed companies’ 
performance -, it was clear that these venues too, needed to have a structure reform. In 
particular, the mutual structure era had come to a solemn end with the emergence of new 
regulation and competition from other venues. Competition came from different angles but 
what I consider to have been the main trigger for legal competition between exchanges were 
ECNs. With the appearance of new technological venues, where liquidity was easily 
attainable and, consequently, transaction costs for customers were diminishing, investors were 
rapidly opting for these new exchanges. Given this set-up, the traditional exchanges were 
facing increasing competition and they could no longer enjoy their monopoly positions. 
Moreover, competition was downsizing the high revenue levels of traditional exchanges. As a 
result, traditional stock exchanges needed to introduce new variables to maximise their value. 
This resulted in the introduction of a residual claimant, which came as a result of 
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demutualization. In other words, demutualization was the separation of ownership and 
membership rights, in the sense that with the introduction of a governing board (which 
represents the outside ownership), members could no longer maximise self-profits but, 
instead, they were driven to maximise the venues’ potential. We could also argue that the 
growing heterogeneity between members was also a catalyst for the structure change, since 
members were no longer focusing on maximising the exchanges’ value. 
 
As presented before, Macey and O’Hara (MOH) (2002) too, discuss that the services offered 
by traditional exchanges are now readily available on electronic venues. As a consequence of 
this, competition takes on a central role and gradually erodes the revenues of the traditional 
stock exchanges. Moreover, together with the increase of competition, regulation also 
assumed new trends and removed barriers so as to promote technological exchanges. An 
example of this was the European Unions’ Investment Service Directive (ISD) reforms, which 
came to enable companies to list abroad. As a consequence of this, and explored by Ramos 
(2006b), stocks were no longer enforced to be traded on a national venue only; an enterprise 
could list abroad, on an exchange of its choice. Therefore, the main international exchanges 
were now enjoying the barrier removal, whilst small national exchanges were struggling to 
level-off profits. Naturally, the technological and structural change involves a great volume of 
financial resources; hence, many small exchanges were questioning their future and survival. 
In an attempt to rapidly respond to this moving equilibrium, a vast number of small exchanges 
grouped to increase their competitive advantage with the international exchanges. Take the 
Euronext Stock Exchange as an example. Euronext initially established itself as the alliance of 
the Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris stock exchanges, in order to compete with international 
venues, such as LSE or NYSE. 
 
The introduction of the Stock Exchange Automated Quotation - International (SEAQ-I) in the 
LSE is an example of the competitive threat posed by an ECN. SEAQ-I was an automated 
quote-driven system that enabled dealers in London to analyse the market of “block trades in 
European blue-chip companies” (Hazarika, 2005: 9). After its implementation in London, in 
1986, most of the small traditional exchanges in Europe, such as Borsa Italiana (Milan), were 
experiencing a decrease in profits, directly linked to the reforms brought about by SEAQ-I. 
The ECN was actively fostering competition between exchanges and, to a certain extent it 
was threatening exchanges around Europe. Pagano (1998), through a set of discussions, 
shows us how the dealers in London were maximising their profits through SEAQ-I; they 
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were constantly in contact with customers off the call auction, which in other European 
markets was not even legal, let alone an occurrence. Therefore, we can prematurely conclude 
that technology has promoted competition and, hence, ended the monopoly exchange era.6 
 
Another benefit offered by the technological venues was the reduction of transaction costs. 
Mishkin and Strahan (1999), and Allen, McAndrews and Strahan (2002) discuss that 
technology triggered a reduction of transaction fees, which meant that exchange users were 
thus impelled to change the venue they did business with. This certainly was one of the causes 
that drove exchange members (brokers) to vote against demutualizations. Members came to 
see that the introduction of technology into exchanges was eroding their technical expertise. 
Furthermore, technology advances in the equity industry were the catalysts for reforms of 
regulatory barriers. As Nasdaqs’ technological advances proved to be better for exchange 
users, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) rapidly reformed regulations in order to 
regulate technological bourses. As illustrated by Ramos (2006b), technology is usually the 
trigger for regulatory reforms. The author compares these regulatory reforms in the United 
States, to the Banking industries’ reform that occurred in the United States earlier, which was 
catalysed by the introduction of ATMs. 
 
On the other hand, users of traditional exchanges, who were members too, voted forth 
technology, once the tool was proving to be value-enhancing for the exchanges that adopted 
it. In spite of this, the heterogeneity between members and the consistent resistance of brokers 
regarding technology, since it eroded their individual profits, kept the venues in a stand-by 
mode. Large international banks, members of exchanges, were threatening to collude and 
leave the exchange if the brokers, who were members too, would not vote forth technology. In 
Amsterdam, the user-members of the exchange successfully managed to introduce 
technological trading tools and eliminate the costly trading-floor. Then again, as modelled by 
Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), “members could not be coerced to compel participation.” 
(Hazarika, 2005: 10) Regarding this matter, Hart and Moore (1996) clearly conclude that in 
this scenario, stock exchanges are better off with outside ownership structures. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Markets are now truly contestable and, therefore, monopolies can no longer enjoy their positions due to the 
threat posed by potential competition, assuming zero sunk costs and free entry and exit. Baumol, Panzar and 
Willig’s (1982) theory of Contestable Markets 
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With the emergence of technological exchanges and demise of regulatory and national 
boundaries, the costs inherent to set up a trading venue diminished considerably; resulting in 
the evaporation of monopolistic stock exchanges. As a result of minor exchange start-up 
costs, new venues could set up operations with more ease, as opposed to the scenario where 
an exchange monopoly existed – abolishing any possibility for small venues to enter the 
market. As Aggarwal (2002) explains in her investigation, the mutual structure was not 
sufficiently flexible and financially agile to face competition and, consequently, the structure 
change came as a solution for this problem. Aggarwal (2002) demonstrated – through a set of 
examples -, how the traditional member structure exchanges were, generally, inert towards 
technological competition. As discussed previously, this inertia towards competition may 
have been caused by member heterogeneity (where the specialised brokers wanted to protect 
themselves against the technological era that came to substitute the intermediaries’ role).  
 
On another approach, Mendiola and O’Hara (MeOH) (2003) analysed whether 
demutualization was value-enhancing, or not. Through accounting, returns and risk-based 
measures, the authors managed to conclude that the corporate change in bourses’ around the 
globe was value-enhancing. Furthermore, the authors show the reader that demutualization, 
although value-enhancing, is not problem-solving. Through the example of the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE), which I will analyse in my data (in section 4), the authors demonstrate that 
demutualization cannot solve problems inherent to some venues (i.e. demutualization comes 
to maximize the value of the venues and not magically solve its problems). In the same paper, 
MeOH (2003) also conclude that that “listed stock exchanges generally outperform both the 
stocks in their market and the IPOs listed on these exchanges.” (Mendiola and O’Hara, 2003: 
23) Additionally, the authors conclude that the “fraction of equity sold to outsiders” is 
positively linked with performance. MeOH argue that as the fraction of outside shareholders 
augments, the fraction of brokerage members on the exchanges’ capital is diluted, therefore 
eliminating the problems linked to heterogeneity between members. In other words, with an 
increasing fraction of outside shareholders, exchanges were then enabled to approve strategies 
which were detrimental for broker-members but value-enhancing for the venue itself. DiNoia 
(1998) credibly argues how traditional exchanges’ decision-making by members was 
consistently linked to self-profits, in opposition to the venues’ potential maximization. Given 
this argument, DiNoia presents demutualization as the best residual claimant (value 
maximization) for the bourse. On the contrary, the performance of IPOs for non-exchange 
companies is negatively linked to the fraction of outside shareholders. Habib and Ljungqvist 
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(2001), Loughran and Ritter (2002), and Bradley and Jordan (2002) document how a greater 
fraction of shares sold to outsiders can be detrimental for the performance of non-exchange 
enterprises. 
 
Hazarikas’ (2005) papers’ central idea focuses on the outcomes of demutualization, 
depending on the circumstance: competitive or non-competitive environments. The author 
sharply concludes that demutualization is an enhancer of volume or order flow. In either case 
– competition or no competition -, demutualization brings about a number of strategic 
differences to the bourse (such as lower transaction fees for users) which enable it to compete 
within the new era of technological exchanges and, as a consequence of this, trading volumes 
increase significantly. The difference between a scenario with competition or no competition 
lies in cost matters. The author shows, through a set of equations with mean-spread 
quotations, that in a competitive environment, the post demutualization transaction costs for 
the stock exchanges’ users tend to fall, as a result of the strategies implemented with the 
introduction of the residual claimant. On the other hand, in an environment with no 
competition, within the short-run of demutualization occurring, costs tend to decrease as a 
result of strategies to attain higher trading volumes; however, as there is no competition, in 
the long-run, transaction costs for the customers tend to increase again. In other words, in the 
circumstance of no competition, the introduction of the residual claimant comes to lower 
transaction costs and thus, volume increases, but as there is no competition, members can 
promptly increase transaction costs again, once the order flow attained through the residual 
claimant will not abandon the exchange; there is no other venue to create competitive threats.  
 
On the other hand, Steil (2002b) studies the effects of competition on the mutual structure 
exchanges – erosion of profits -, and the dilution of national membership as a results of the 
demise of regulation and national boundaries. Specifically, the author points out two central 
triggers for demutualization. Primarily, Steil (2002b) points out how members could no 
longer resist changes and, as a consequence of this, were keener towards demutualization. 
Secondly, the author highlights how the demise of national boundaries enabled international 
members to dilute the power of national members in bourses around the globe. 
 
Ramos (2006b) adopts a completely different approach: the author concentrates her paper on 
the catalysts for the structure change and going public. Firstly, and in accordance with the 
conclusions of Perotti and Volpin (2004), the author shows us, with 109 exchange examples 
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and probit models, that democracy is one of the triggers for demutualization. Through a 
consistent thread of ideas, the author supports her conclusion demonstrating that the greater 
the levels of democracy, the smaller the levels of lobbying in the political system, which as a 
result increases the contestability of markets – more competition for trading venues, which 
later is the catalyst for the structure change. Furthermore, Ramos concludes that the 
demutualized entities then go public in order to raise new capital7 and finance acquisitions, as 
documented by Rosen, Smart and Zutter (2005) for the banking industry. 
 
2.4 The demutualized exchanges 
As we have previously evaluated, demutualization is the separation of trading and ownership 
rights; in practice, it diminishes the power of exchange members and, through a structure 
change, it introduces a new governing body into the exchanges’ structure. Therefore, 
demutualization of stock exchanges comes as the response to growing competition from 
ECNs. Moreover, factors such as the demise of regulatory and national boundaries came to 
foster competition, which indulged the importance of a structure change in the traditional 
trading venues. 
 
As reported by other authors: “demutualization separates trading and ownership rights, 
diversifying the exchanges’ shareholder base.” (Ramos, 2006b: 3) The outcome of this 
structure change for the venue itself is extremely beneficial, due to the fact that it increases 
trading volume and order flow. As a result, the profits of the exchange also increase. On the 
other hand, the members of the traditional mutual structure lost out immensely. Firstly, as 
they tried to resist demutualization, their revenues were continuously being eroded as a result 
of a more contestable market, where a monopoly could no longer enjoy its advantageous 
position due to the threats of competition. Secondly, with demutualization, members of the 
traditional exchanges also witnessed a loss of benefits: their power inside the exchange 
diminished as a result of the increasing foreign members and, later on, with the new outside 
members, whose fraction of capital gradually increased, diluting the power of the predecessor 
members. However, as put by Hazarika (2005) and Ramos (2006b), I too question how the 
NYSE was able to resist demutualization for such a prolonged period of time. At a first 
glance, in line with the arguments of Fleckner (2005), NYSE did not demutualize, in a certain 
way, because members managed to resist demutualization more than once. On the other hand, 
                                                 
7
 In line with the findings of Boehmer and Ljungqvist (2002) and Kim and Wiesbach (2005) 
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as discussed by Hazarika, the NYSE was sharply competing and getting ahead of the new era 
bourses and it implemented internal regulations, such as voting rights, that enabled the 
exchange to be not only competitive, but also the largest share dealer in the world. This 
example will be discussed more exhaustively later in this paper.      
 
Interestingly, demutualization offers the exchange a number of benefits which undoubtedly 
outplay the mutual-member structure, one of which is the fact that demutualization, in a way, 
guarantees the future of certain trading volumes. This is why, with the demutualization, in 
line with the examples of Coase (1937), the bourse was enabled to offer ownership to 
customers and so, as these customers then became shareholders, they would never leave the 
exchange. In a way, this allocation of power and authority to some clients was a way to 
guarantee a certain volume of trades. Likewise, as shown before in this text, giving a fraction 
of capital to outsiders is correlated to better performances. 
 
In this line of thought, Zingales (2000) and Rajan and Zingales (2001) too, discuss the 
importance of the customers’ “monopsony power”. Through a variety of examples the authors 
demonstrate that even with a structure change, the trading venues are still dependent on 
mutual incentives. This is due to the contestability of the market, which, although the 
members of stock exchanges can no longer exploit users, they still have to pay out incentives 
to the customers, in order to retain their trading volumes and investments. 
 
In conclusion, exchanges were better suited with a cooperative structure when membership 
was homogeneous and markets were not contestable. However, with the increasing threat of 
competition fostered by ECNs, the markets became truly contestable and monopoly 
exchanges could no longer enjoy the benefits of being sole providers of the market. In 
addition, as technological trading venues started to evolve, it was implicit that national and 
regulatory barriers needed a reform. This reform came and increasingly promoted 
competition. On the other hand, the members of the exchanges were no longer homogeneous, 
with the large international banks wanting to shift towards technology and the broker-
members resisting this tendency. Undoubtedly, the only cure for the problem and to redirect 
trading volume away from the new technological trading venues, was demutualization – 
separation of ownership and membership. With the introduction of a residual claimant, stock 
exchanges could promptly create strategies in order to fight competition and promote the 
value of the venue itself. However, the circumstances in which the exchanges demutualize – 
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competition or no competition environments – are crucially decisive in what respects the 
outcome, in the sense that only in a competitive environment can we witness the true results 
of demutualization. If there is no competition, ownership is indulged to re-raise the 
transaction costs for the bourses’ users, similarly to the monopolistic situation. 
 
3. Data 
3.1 Case Study 
Given the state of the art of the exchange structure, I was thoroughly intrigued with the 
benefits that demutualization brought about. As stated by Ramos (2006b), the number of 
demutualizing exchanges in the mid 90s is not comparable to those of the 21st century. In a 
survey conducted by the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), in 2002, 63% of its 
members were non-mutual structures (i.e. demutualized exchanges), whilst in the mid 90s 
only a mere 10% of the members were for-profit venues. Along with these results, many 
authors discussed the benefits of for-profit structures and how, in the future, a majority of 
exchanges would be non-mutual. Furthermore, in 2004 already, 9 of the 10 largest operating 
stock exchanges were demutualized; only the NYSE constituted an exception. Moreover, in 
2007, all of the 10 largest exchanges were demutualized venues (See Exhibit A). This data is 
somewhat indicative of the benefits demutualization poses. 
 
Given these raw and introductory notes, we seemingly conclude that demutualization is 
necessarily the answer for competitive pressures in the exchange sector. Yet, we can put 
forward another question: if demutualization is beneficial for the exchange, why did the 
NYSE take such a long period to assume a for-profit structure? Mendiola and O’Hara (2003), 
and Hazarika (2005) discussed this matter and came to numerous conclusions. In accordance 
with the previous literature, I believe that demutualization is a response to competition, which 
surged with the technological trading venues and demise of regulatory and national barriers. 
As a result of this, if an exchange was capable of facing competition - as was the case of the 
NYSE - it did not need to demutualize. The NYSE intelligently thought out its strategies and 
adopted a culture that maximised the exchanges’ value. This is, the members of the NYSE 
acted as the residual claimant of the venue, since their policies were value-enhancing for the 
exchange, as opposed to other realities - where the policies adopted aimed at the members’ 
private profits. The strategies adopted included the pricing of seats, the voting rules and 
consistent competitive analysis. The exchange not only was the largest bourse in the world, 
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but also the most dynamic and competition-aware one. If we closely look at the history of the 
venue, we can understand that the NYSE was thoroughly competing with its closer rival, 
Nasdaq. Every time the Nasdaq introduced new strategies into its business, the NYSE would 
immediately innovate and create strategies that surpassed Nasdaqs’ competitive movements. 
Furthermore, in the years prior to demutualization, the NYSE was the single global trader to 
have a floor trading platform, which to a certain point was a competitive advantage for the 
venue. As a consequence of this, the exchanges’ revenues were not eroding at unsustainable 
rates; volume was actually increasing – a fact that indulged members to resist 
demutualization. However, in 2006 the exchange did eventually demutualize, as a 
consequence of its obsolete and inefficient structure – it was losing its competitive nature. 
Thus, I come to believe that demutualization is indeed a response to competition. 
 
Important players, such as LSE, demutualized much earlier than the NYSE, which raises 
another question: why did other international stock exchanges demutualize previously to the 
NYSE? I believe the answer is, once again, competition. Even thought the LSE, too, adopted 
competitive, value-enhancing strategies before its demutualization (with the reform of 
financial policies in the UK, in the 1980s), competitive pressures from other global venues 
were washing away the LSE’s trading volumes. As a response to this, the exchange needed a 
residual claimant who would come to maximise its value and positively-enhance 
performance. 
 
My study is strictly directed at the performance-demutualization relationship of stock 
exchanges. In other words, in accordance and line with the paper of Mendiola and O’Hara 
(2003), I postulate that demutualization is value-enhancing. As a result, I claim that 
demutualization is strictly related with better performances. To analyse this hypothesis, I use 
a set of financial, performance and ownership indicators which enable me to conclude on the 
outcomes of for-profit exchanges.  
 
In order to make the study the least subjective possible, I use the data of four distinct sample 
exchanges. The data I use is from exchanges in Asia (Hong Kong Stock Exchange), Europe 
(London Stock Exchange and Hellenic Stock Exchange), and North America (New York 
Stock Exchange). The idea of including the Hellenic Exchange is to understand the principles 
of demutualization. Demutualization cannot solve problems related to basis financial structure 
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- as suggested by Mendiola and O’Hara (2003) -; the process is value-enhancing, not problem 
solving.      
 
The financial ratios which I selected for the analysis are the following: 
• Return on Assets (RoA), which is the quotient of operational profit and total assets, 
strictly answers how demutualization has affected the relationship between 
economical results and assets;  
• Return on Equity (RoE), which is the relationship of net profit and equity, gives me a 
notion about the financial efficiency of the exchange, given demutualization;  
• Profitability from Operations (PO): operational profit / total revenue, enables me to 
account for efficiency from operations;  
• Asset Turnover (AT) – total revenues / total assets -, analyses the proportion of 
revenues in comparison to the exchanges’ assets; which indirectly measures value-
enhancement, too; 
• Financial Leverage (FL): total liabilities / total assets. It enables me to analyse whether 
liabilities increase (in comparison to the assets) with the structure change, given that 
demutualization is a costly process. 
 
To capture performance and distribution of ownership I analyse the evolution of listed 
companies and shareholder constituencies before and after demutualization. The evolution of 
volumes enables me to conclude about the aspect of volume enhancement as a response to 
demutualization. Furthermore, to ensure that the evolution of listed enterprises was not linked 
solely to evolutions of the market, I then set a comparison between the price quotation of the 
exchange itself and a quotation of the exchanges’ underlying index, similar to MeOH (2003) 
study. This enables me to conclude whether or not volume-enhancement is a response to 
demutualization. On the other hand, relating the evolution of shareholders to the performance 
of the exchange enables me to conclude on the relationship between outsider shareholders and 
better performances of the venue, as suggested by Mendiola and O’Hara (2003).   
 
The data used was collected throughout a number of sources. Primarily, I collected data 
aligned with listed enterprises and trading volumes on the WFE data source, which displays 
all the statistics related to its member exchanges. All the data used for the financial indicators 
– total revenues, operational profits, net profits, total assets, total equity and total liabilities – 
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was obtained in Reuters Knowledge; a source with a variety of data for numerous industries, 
including stock exchanges. To analyse price quotations and financial indicators I obtained the 
data on Bloomberg and Reuters Knowledge, too. For general information concerning each of 
the exchanges, I collected data from each exchanges’ site and also Bloomberg and Reuters 
Knowledge. 
 
3.2 The historical nature of each sample exchange 
The historical nature of each exchange analysed in this paper, is important in the sense that it 
is explanative of some results we will further see in the analysis (section 4). 
  
The Athens Stock exchange was the first, of the sample exchanges, to demutualize.8 The 
venue dates back to 1876, when it established itself as a regulated cooperative exchange. In 
1988, as a consequence of structural reforms, the exchange opened its membership to 
brokerage enterprises. During the 1990s, the role of the exchange was strictly linked with the 
regulation of its members’ trades. As a consequence of the structural reforms, which also 
included moving to a private limited structure, in 2000 the Athens Stock Exchange became 
part of the Hellenic Exchanges SA (HELEX), which also merged with the Athens Derivatives 
Exchange (ADE). As a result, the demutualized Athens Exchange SA (ATHEX) was created 
in 2000, setting the track for its IPO, which came shortly after. 
 
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) dates back to 1891, even though its first name was 
Association of Stockbrokers in Hong Kong. Throughout the 20th century, the HKSE merged 
with four national exchanges, as a result of financial reforms and securities markets’ 
standardization. In the mid 90s, already due to the pressures from competition, the HKSE 
adopted a technological platform, denominated the Automatic Order Matching and Execution 
System (AMS). Along with the technological system, the exchange also attempted to promote 
volume growth through the diversification of products; in 1995, the HKSE incorporated a 
stock option market. Later, in 2000, the HKSE demutualized through a merger with the Hong 
Kong Futures Exchange, Ltd. and the Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company, Ltd, creating 
                                                 
8
 For historical contextualization, it is important to mention that the first exchange to demutualize, in the world, 
was the Stockholm Stock Exchange, in 1993. Later, the exchange went public and listed on itself. For 
informational aspects only, I refer that it merged with OM Stockholm, a technological company member of OM 
Gruppen.    
Dissertation Jaime Homem de Sá 
Corporate Governance- Demutualization of stock exchanges 
 27 
the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx). The IPO of the exchange came 
shortly after the structure change in 2000. 
 
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) dates back to the beginnings of the 19th century, when a 
number of brokers - who were expelled from the Royal Exchange due to rowdy behaviour - 
gathered at Jonathan’s Coffee Shop to trade debts. After WWII, regional exchanges in 
England merged with the LSE, in order to create a sole and larger exchange. However, the 
most important reforms of the LSE came in 1986, with the so-called Big Bang. The 
deregulation of the exchange disabled many of the voting rights of members – in order to 
promote the venues’ value, in opposition to members’ private profits -, and promoted a better 
trading floor and off-floor venue. At this time, SEAQ-I was introduced, as part of a 
competitive strategy, which resulted in augmenting trade volumes. Yet, in 2000, the exchange 
made the decision to go public, and we hereby consider this date as its demutualization date. 
The effective IPO came shortly after, in July 2001. Later on, in 2007, again in response to 
competitive pressures and in order to capture a greater trade volume, the LSE bought the 
Italian exchange, Borsa Italiana. As a consequence of its value, the transaction demanded for 
great volumes of capital from the LSE. 
 
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) traces its roots back to the 18th century; partially 
created to finance the revolutionary war. Nevertheless, it was in the 1800’s that its 
significance grew exponentially. In 1886, the venue was already trading millions of shares per 
day. In spite of this, in October 1929, the Wall Street crash was a huge setback for a further 
evolution of the exchange; it took years for the venue to recover from the crash. As a 
consequence of this, regulations were adopted in order to avoid crashes and re-promote 
volume. In the last decade of the 20th century, technology and regulations’ reforms brought 
about competition to the NYSE, resulting in consecutive attempts to demutualize the 
exchange. However, only in 2003 did the trader begin its process of demutualization. The 
completion of the process came through a merger with ArchaEx, in 2006 – creating the NYSE 
Group, Inc, whose IPO came shortly after. Further on, in 2007, as a result of a strategic 
operation, the NYSE merged with the Euronext exchange – which initially set up as a merger 
between some of Europe’s exchanges (Amsterdam, Paris, and others, later on).     
 
3.3 Hypothesis 
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Following the thoughts and arguments of the theories previously presented, I am now enabled 
to discuss my hypothesis. 
 
As I expect the number of shareholders to increase, I believe it is implicit that the value of the 
equity of the exchanges will increase – in a sale of capital scenario. As equity increases, the 
value of the RoE will decrease, unless there is an increase in the net profits of the enterprise. 
On the other hand, as I expect profits to increase given demutualization, due to the 
introduction of a residual claimant in the exchange, I expect the RoE to remain constant. 
However, in the period right after demutualization, once the benefits of demutualization are 
not immediate, I expect the RoE to decrease. 
 
As I expect better performances post demutualization, in line with other investigations 
(Mendiola and O’Hara, 2003), I believe the RoA and the Profitability from operations will 
increase. The RoA may happen to be constant, in the sense that, with demutualization - which 
may be the result of a merger - the asset volume of the exchange will increase and, 
consequently, the RoA may be constant, or increase only slightly. On the other hand, I expect 
value-enhancement strategies from a demutualized exchange and, therefore, more efficiency 
in the economical matter. In other words, I expect the Profitability from Operations to 
increase. 
 
Asset turnover, in line with the prediction of escalating revenues – given the new for-profit 
structure -, is expected to increase. However, I point at the outset to the possibility of 
increasing assets, with the process of demutualization, which would inevitably determine a 
smaller growth of the Asset Turnover ratio.   
 
Since in a majority of cases, demutualization is completed with a merger, this involves a great 
volume of capital. As a result, stock exchanges need financing and, hence, their liabilities tend 
to increase. In either one of our sample exchanges, there is a merger at the time of 
demutualization, or later, as is the case of the LSE (with the take over of the BI) and the 
NYSE (which merges with Euronext). 
 
As demutualization is no more than the introduction of a residual claimant (or governance 
board), I expect the party to bring in strategies that increase the exchanges’ value. Thus, to 
promote the value of the exchange, the party needs to promote its revenues, which can be 
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observed in the volume of trades or listed enterprises. Therefore, I expect the number of listed 
firms to increase, post demutualization. 
 
In line with the previous theory, demutualization is triggered by competition and the need to 
increase the value of the exchange. Consequently, in the periods prior to demutualization, we 
should expect the number of listed firms in each of the sample exchanges to decrease (erosion 
of revenues as a result of competition – contestable markets). On the other hand, and aligned 
with the previous hypothesis, given demutualization, I predict the number of listed firms will 
increase, as a consequence of value-enhancement strategies, such as decreasing transaction 
costs (as determined by Hazarika, 2005). 
 
Following the reasoning of Mendiola and O’Hara (2003), I predict that the sample exchanges 
with more outsider shareholders are positively linked with better performances. As the 
traditional member structure is diluted, with the entrance of new shareholders, the power of 
the primary members to influence the exchanges’ strategies is minor and, therefore, the 
strategies are now related to promoting the venues’ value, in opposition to the promotion of 
members’ self-profits; enhancing better performances of the bourse. 
 
As discussed by Mendiola and O’Hara (2003), too, I predict that exchanges with financial 
base problems will not have better performances as a result of demutualization. I use the 
ATHEX as the sample for this hypothesis. The main concept which I want the reader to retain 
is that demutualization is value-enhancing, not problem solving, and therefore, financial base 
problems cannot be overcome simply with the mere structural change. 
 
To summarize, after demutualization: 
H1: RoE is more likely to be constant or decrease; 
H2: RoA and Profitability from Operations will probably increase; 
H3: Financial Leverage is most likely to increase; 
H4: Asset Turnover is expected to be constant or rising; 
H5: I expect an increasing number of listed firms in the moments post demutualization; 
H6: I expect the number of listed firms to decrease in the periods prior to demutualization; 
H7: More outsider shareholders are probably linked to better exchange performances; 
H8: Demutualization is value-enhancing; not problem solving.  
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4. Analysis 
4.1 Financial indicators’ analysis 
In this subsection I will analyse the evolution of the financial indexes, which I previously 
mentioned in subsection 3.1. For the analysis to be more transparent for the reader, I present a 
graph (with the evolution of all the indicators) for each of the sample exchanges. Yet, to 
further acquaint any doubts of the reader, I suggest the reader analyses Exhibits B, C, D and E 
(for further information on Cash Flows, Balance Sheets and Financial indicators of each 
sample exchange). 
 
4.1.1 ATHEX 
Performance of Financial indicatores of the ASE from 1998 through to 2007
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Fig. 2 Financial Indicators of the ATHEX 
The data is confusing but, when analysing, we can gradually understand the trends. In a first 
observation, I clearly notice an overall peak in the period before demutualization (1999), 
which may be the result of the structure change announcement. However, I cannot assert that 
the reason for the peak in 1999 is due to an increase in the confidence levels of investors, 
resulting from the announcement of the structure change. Another general and primary 
observation is that all the financial indicators assume a fall tendency until 2002, which 
indicates that the effects of demutualization are not immediate (since demutualization was 
completed in 2000) - as predicted by myself. After 2002, although inconstant, all the ratios 
assume a growing tendency; fact that consolidates the prediction of mine, that 
demutualization is value-enhancing. 
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Concerning hypothesis 1 on the behaviour of the RoE, the first observation to make is that the 
RoE is rather inconsistent; it assumes a down drift until 2002 when the trend reverses. The 
fall tendency of the RoE is motivated by a significantly decreasing net profit (which assumes 
a negative value in 2002, 20,22M Euro; less 179% than in 2001). However, from the point of 
inflection onwards, the trend is positive; generally motivated by a recovering net profit and 
constant total assets.  
 
In line with the drive of the net profit, the operational incomes’ inflection point happens two 
moments given demutualization (2002). On the other hand, due to constant, or insignificantly 
growing total assets, in comparison to an increasing operational profit, the RoA assumes an 
increasing tendency, which comes to a peak in 2007. This peak is attained through a 
significant growth (43%) of the operational profit, in comparison to the mild growth of assets 
(16%). The PO is revealing similar tendencies to that of the RoA, but in more significant 
values. This may be the result of a cost-effective strategy. With the demutualization, a number 
of value-enhancement strategies are implemented, some of which are linked to cost 
efficiency, naturally decreasing operational costs. Therefore, I can comfortably claim that, 
with demutualization, the exchange is enabled to maintain higher levels of net income due to 
a more efficient management of operational costs, amongst other measures. 
 
The percentage evolution of the revenues is analogous to that of the assets; however, the trend 
assumes more significant values - especially in 2005 and 2006, were the revenues register a 
growth of 21 and 60%, respectively, whilst the assets register a fall of 36% in 2005, and 11% 
in 2006. Evaluating the mean trend of the AT, I conclude the trend is positive from 2004 
onwards (4 years post demutualization), as a result of growing revenues and decreasing 
assets.  
 
Financial leverage, as I predicted, grows exponentially in the year prior to demutualization 
and then decreases gradually. The significant increase in 1999 is explained by the liability 
boost of 313%, in opposition to practically constant assets. As earlier suggested by me, this is 
the result of the merger between HELLEX and ADE, which involves a great volume of 
capital. 
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In conclusion, the general trend of the financial indicators enables me to conclude that a for-
profit exchange is value-enhancing. On the other hand, I can also conclude that the increase in 
liabilities is linked to the merger situation, which, in a majority of cases, is linked to the 
process of demutualization. Furthermore, I came to conclude that the effects of 
demutualization are not immediate, in the sense that demutualization occurs in 2000 and the 
point of inflection of the negative tendencies only comes in 2002, after the dotcom bubble. 
Moreover, through this analysis, we see that demutualization is not the solution for the 
financial basis problems of the exchange (as discussed by Mendiola and O’Hara, 2003). As is 
obvious, in 2001 the ATHEX registers a negative net profit; a fact which is not expected from 
a financially healthy firm.  
 
4.1.2 HKEx 
Performance of Financial indicators of the HKEx from 1999 through to 2007
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Fig. 3 Financial Indicators of the HKEx 
Unlike the trends of the ATHEX, in the case of the HKEx, there is a general increase of the 
financial indicators (except for FL) up to the moment of demutualization. As of the moment 
of demutualization onwards, the distinct ratios assume different tendencies. In a first analysis, 
we can clearly see that the RoE, the PO and the FL ratio are increasing in the periods after 
demutualization. On the other hand, the RoA and AT indicators are rather constant, even 
though the RoA seems to follow a slight uphill tendency in the years following 
demutualization. 
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Throughout the analysis period, I denoted that the equity of the exchange remains rather 
constant, whilst the net profits vary from negative to positive growths. In the periods 
subsequent to demutualization (2001 and 2002), the net profits of the exchange grow 
negatively 15 and 21%, respectively. From 2002 onwards, RoE registers successive increases, 
as a results of better net incomes and, generally, constant equity, contradicting my hypothesis 
of constant or decreasing RoE’s 
 
Similar to the net profit tendency, the operational profits of the HKEx also have an inflection 
point in the second year after demutualization. This is, until 2002, the evolution of the 
operational income is negative, whereas from 2002 onwards, the drive is positive. This is a 
result of demutualization, since I believe the effects of the structure change are not 
instantaneous. On the other hand, the evolution of the total revenues is also similar but, in 
contrast, the volumes are much less significant. Take the year of 2003, for example, where 
operational profits grow 24%, as opposed to a smaller growth of 12% of the total revenues. 
This results in an increasing PO ratio, which leads me to the conclusion that demutualization 
is efficiency-enhancing, which later results in value-enhancement. The RoA, on the other 
hand, is rather insignificant, due to the fact that the evolutions and levels of both the 
operational profits and total assets are similar. However, the slight growth of the RoA from 
2004 onwards indicates that demutualization is value-enhancing, once the economic profit is 
promoting values superior to those of the total assets. 
 
Much like the RoA, the AT ratio is rather insignificant. The trend can be trivial but, 
nevertheless, important for our analysis. If we closely observe, we can see that the indicator 
assumes a negative drive. This is due to the fact that in certain moments, such as 2006 and 
2007, the evolution of revenues is smaller than that of the assets. In summary, this indicator is 
inconclusive. 
 
On the other hand, the FL ratio also assumes a tendency different to that predicted by me. 
Unlike the case of the ATHEX, the FL only seems to increase in the years after 
demutualization. Moreover, the assets of the exchange remain rather constant, until the period 
of 2006 and 2007, where they increase 76 and 117%, respectively. This is somewhat 
confusing, in the sense that during demutualization, the HKSE merged with other venues, 
therefore increasing the assets’ levels. Moreover, due to the costs of the structural change, I 
expected the venue to increase its liabilities in order to finance the operation. This 
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phenomenon did not happen; only in 2006 and 2007 did the liabilities increase exponentially 
(89 and 126%, respectively). However, the levels of this indicator are significantly high, 
indicating that there was a constant need of financing in the periods prior to and post 
demutualization. Furthermore, I can say that the decrease of the liabilities are a consequence 
of a financial settlement, given that the need for capital – for demutualization -, is over once 
the structure change is completed.  
 
In conclusion, and mainly focusing on the profitability from operations ratio, I conclude that 
demutualization is efficiency and value enhancing. In other words, the strategies brought into 
the exchange with the introduction of a governance board are maximizing the venues’ value. 
Therefore, demutualization is conclusively beneficial for the exchange. Moreover, I can also 
conclude that there is a need of extra capital to fund demutualization and, consequently, there 
is a need to increase liabilities. On the other hand, once the structure change is complete, the 
exchange gradually reduces the amount of liabilities, since there is no more need of excess 
capital. 
 
4.1.3 LSE 
Performance of Financial indicators of the LSE from 1997 through t0 2007
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Fig. 4 Financial indicators of the LSE 
Due to the fact that the LSE traces the roots of its demutualization back to the 1980s, with the 
Big Bang reforms, I expect the indicators to be less expressive – as was the case of the 
previous sample exchanges. This is, the exchange has adopted for-exchange policies since the 
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1980s and, therefore, I do not expect to see radical evolutions, but instead, consistent healthy 
values for each indicator. 
 
Unlike the cases of the previously analysed sample exchanges, the LSE’s financial indicators’ 
trends are rather inconstant. However, I can refer that, in general, the indicators only assume 
inconstant drives until the moment of demutualization. From then onwards, the overall trend 
is positive, peaking in 2006, when the LSE took over the BI. This could lead to a preliminary 
conclusion on the positive linkage of demutualization and value-enhancement. 
 
I could say that the net incomes of the LSE are rather consistent and generally increasing, 
except for 1998 and 2000, where the evolution of profits was negative (decreasing 48 and 
53%, respectively). In contrast, I denote that the evolution of the equity is not constant and, 
especially in 2006, the trend assumes a rather significantly negative evolution. This results 
from a surprising negative equity, which I link to the takeover of the BI. As a result, the RoE 
assumes a placid uphill drive. However, in 2006, motivated by the negative equity, the value 
put forward to shareholders is significantly affected; resulting in a negative return of 31,09%. 
 
In the case of the operational income too, the trend assumed is generally uphill, excepting 
1998 and 2000, where the evolution is negative (decreasing 57 and 47%, respectively). On the 
other hand, in 2001 the operational profits’ evolution peaks, with a growth of 201%, alike to 
the significant growth of 2006 (104%). These peaks may result from the IPO, in 2001, and 
take over of the BI, in 2006. Alternatively, the evolution of the total assets is rather constant, 
with the exception of 2007, where the assets boom, with a positive evolution of 7.225% (in 
consequence of the acquisition of the BI). As a result, the RoA is rather constant throughout 
the period analysed, for the exception of 2007 where it abruptly falls, in consequence of the 
booming assets. Moreover, the evolution of the revenues is fairly alike to that of the 
operational profit; resulting in a generally constant PO ratio. Furthermore, I can state that a 
PO ratio, which generally varies between the 20 and 40%, reflects a great amount of 
efficiency. This is, if the PO indicator is assuming high values, it means that the exchange is 
cost-efficient, in the sense that the revenues’ absorption of economical costs is decreasing. 
 
Due to a constant positive evolution from the total revenues, in comparison to the total assets, 
the AT ratio generally assumes a rising tendency. The only exception is in 2007, due to the 
previously mentioned asset boom. This indicates that demutualization is value-enhancing, 
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since it is efficiently promoting the revenues. Moreover, the proportion of revenues is 
continuously surpassing the assets; a fact which is indicative of value maximization. 
 
Liabilities, as I expected, grow exponentially (2.869%) in the moment of the BI’s takeover. 
This is due to the fact that operation involves a surplus of capital and, consequently, the 
exchange needs external financing. Another important fact is that in 2006 too, probably 
related to the acquisition process, the equity of the LSE assumes a negative value, which is 
rather abnormal in my opinion. However, this is probably in line with a strategy for-
acquisition of the BI. 
 
The evolutions of each indicator are fairly constant, but their individual values are, in a 
majority of moments, rather appealing and value-enhancing. In other words, the evolutions of 
the financial ratios analysed are rather monotonous, but their percentage level is indicative of 
value-enhancement. Moreover, in the case of the LSE too, we can see that, with 
demutualization (2000), the strategies adopted by the exchange are value-enhancing, in the 
sense that the indicators reflect, amongst others, cost-efficiency strategies. Therefore, I hereby 
conclude that demutualization is promoting the maximization of the exchanges’ value. 
 
4.1.4 NYSE Euronext 
Performance of Financial indicators of the NYSE from 2002 through to 2007
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Fig. 5 Financial Indicators of the NYSE Euronext 
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In the case of the NYSE, I caution the reader for the limited amount of data. Once the 
exchange only completed its demutualization in 2006, and our data is up to 2007, the 
significance of the data is related to the behaviour prior to demutualization. Anyhow, the 
analysis is pertinent, in the sense that it enables me to analyse the behaviour pre-
demutualization. 
 
My first observation is that there is a point of inflection in 2004 (2 years before the 
completion of demutualization). From 2004 onwards, RoE, RoA and PO assume a clear 
positive drive, excepting 2007 (merger with Euronext). On the other hand, AT and FL peak in 
2003 and remain rather constant for some years until 2007, where both indicators fall 
considerably. As you may acknowledge, these trends are coherent with the start and end of 
the demutualization process.  
 
In the years preceding the demutualization process, shareholders of the NYSE were 
experiencing a relatively inconsistent return. Probably due to competition from other venues, 
the net profits of the exchange were assuming negative trends until the moment before 
demutualization. However, in 2006 and 2007 (periods of demutualization and merger with 
Euronext, respectively), net profits grew 400 and 214%, accordingly. This fact is significantly 
indicative of the benefits of the introduction of a residual claimant; maximisation of the 
exchanges’ value. However, the equity of the NYSE was also assuming similar trends and, 
consequently, the evolutions of RoE in 2006 and 2007 are not explanative, contrary to the 
case of the net profits. 
 
Along the same lines, the operational income assumes a rather inconstant trend but, in the 
year before the completion of demutualization (2005), the evolutions of the EBITDA are 
significantly positive; culminating with a peak-evolution in 2006, of 432%. As we know, the 
NYSE adopted different competitive strategies long before its demutualization completion, 
since its revenues were eroding. These operational profits’ evolutions may be the result of the 
implemented strategies in 2003. The revenues too, assumed an uphill trend in the periods 
prior to demutualization; however, the evolutions (compared to operational profits) were 
minor; resulting in an augmenting PO ratio. This enables me to conclude that the efficiency of 
management was increasing since the start of demutualization until the completion of the 
process. The assets of the exchange were also assuming a positive drive, especially in 2007, 
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with a boost of 379%, resulting from the merger with Euronext. As the evolutional trends of 
the assets were quite significant, the evolution of the RoA was quite mild, or inexpressive. 
 
Furthermore, due to the previously described trends of assets and revenues of the NYSE, the 
AT indicator is rather expressive. In other words, the evolutions of the assets are more 
significant than those of the revenues, but the revenues are higher in value; hence, the 
expressiveness of the indicator. Nonetheless, the growth tendency of the AT ratio in 2003 and 
relatively constant drive from then onwards, indicates that as demutualization started, the 
strategies implemented by the management board were value-enhancing. 
 
The FL ratio peaks in 2002 and maintains a high volume until the moment of the merger with 
Euronext. This indicates that the venue was increasing its liabilities in order to finance the 
transition to a for-profit structure and further merger. The decrease observed of the FL 
indicator in 2007 is resultant of the completion of the merger with Euronext; thus, the volume 
of liabilities is expected to decrease from that moment onwards. 
 
In conclusion, as the venue initiates demutualization, all of its financial indicators assume 
positive drives. I therefore conclude that demutualization is value-enhancing, in the sense that 
the NYSE is consistently increasing its revenues, decreasing its costs and putting value 
forward to shareholders - increasing returns. However, to maintain these trends in the moment 
of demutualization is rather difficult, once there is a resulting increase of equity (due to a sale 
of capital), assets, and others. Moreover, the levels of liabilities also increased in the moments 
prior to the structural change, enabling me to conclude that demutualization is usually aligned 
to a merger, which involves excess finance.  
 
4.1.5 Financial Indicators’ Conclusions 
In an overall conclusion, having analysed all the sample exchanges, I can now state that 
demutualization is value-enhancing. Moreover, I believe the introduction of the residual 
claimant is maximising the value of the exchange, once the strategies implemented are also 
related to cost efficiency. These conclusions are consistently present in all the sample 
exchanges, especially clear with the PO indicator. From this indicator we see that, given or 
close to demutualization, the exchanges are not only increasing its revenues, but also reducing 
its costs. Therefore, the value of the company is being maximised. Furthermore, as expected 
by me, the volume of liabilities is positively linked to mergers or takeovers, which usually 
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occur at the time of demutualization. Of the four sample exchanges, the LSE is the only 
exception towards a merger-demutualization scenario. That is, the LSE is the only venue that 
did not merge with another exchange at the time of demutualization. Yet, probably resultant 
of a value-enhancing strategy, the LSE bought the BI in 2006, as the NYSE merged with 
Euronext, in 2007 - promoting their revenues. 
 
4.2 Performance Analysis 
In this subsection I will analyse the evolution of the listed firms in each of the sample 
exchanges. The idea of this analysis is to understand whether or not, demutualization is 
volume-enhancing. As in the previous subsection, I will present a graph with the evolutions of 
the total listed companies (in each sample exchange). However, I suggest the reader analyses 
Exhibit F (domestic and foreign listings). To test for influences of the market, I look at the 
underlying indexes of each sample exchange. In other words, I look at the markets’ 
movements in order to positively link the evolutions of listed companies to demutualization, 
and not the markets’ drive. 
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Fig. 6 Total companies listed in each sample exchange 
As is clear, the total of listed companies assumes a positive trend for the LSE and HKEx, 
whilst the drive is negative and relatively constant for the NYSE and ATHEX, respectively. 
 
4.2.1 ATHEX 
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The ATHEX maintains a constant total listings’ trend throughout the analysis period. There 
are minor increases and decreases. However, if we look closely at the evolution, it is 
denotable that there is a peak in the domestic listings in the year of demutualization (2000). 
The same happens for the foreign listings, even though the levels of foreign listings are 
practically inexistent (only one foreign company was listed, in 2000). Furthermore, from the 
period of demutualization up till 2004, the domestic listed companies’ evolution grows 
irrelevantly. From 2004 onwards, the evolution is consecutively negative. Then again, the 
number of foreign listed enterprises grows significantly, but its volume is reduced (three 
foreign enterprises listed, in 2007). Additionally, and contrary to my predictions, in the years 
prior to demutualization, the number of total listed firms does not decrease, indicating that 
other venues were not creating competitive pressures. I conclude that the analysis of the 
ATHEX’s listed firms is practically inconclusive, in the sense that the volumes are 
insignificant. On the other hand, the trend inevitably contradicts my predictions – that 
demutualization is volume-enhancing. When comparing to Athens’ financial index, EXAE 
(Exhibit G), we see that there is a positive evolution of the market. This information confuses 
the analysis furthermore, in the sense that we now cannot conclude whether the evolution of 
the listed companies results from demutualization or market movements. 
 
4.2.2 HKEx 
The total listed firms’ tendency of the HKEx proves my hypothesis (H5) to be correct. From 
the moment of demutualization onwards, the number of listed firms increases significantly. 
Closely analysing each of the constituents of the total listings – domestic and foreign 
enterprises -, we can see that the number of domestic listings increases consecutively post 
demutualization, whilst the number of foreign listings is decreasing or constant. As in the case 
of the ATHEX, the HKEx also shows insignificant volumes of foreign listed firms – a 
maximum of 22 foreign listed companies in 1996 and 9 in 2007. Hence, the trend of the 
foreign listings proves my hypothesis to be wrong, whereas the trend of the domestic listings 
proves it right. Moreover, I find that – contrary to my expectations (H6) -, the number of 
listed firms in the periods prior to demutualization is not decreasing; indicating that 
competitive pressures were not eroding the bourses’ revenues. When I look at the markets’ 
movements, analysing the Hang Seng (Exhibit H), I observe that the index remains rather 
constant, therefore enforcing the idea that the growth of domestic listings is the result of better 
competitive strategies, brought into the exchange through demutualization. 
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4.2.3 LSE 
The LSE’s total listings’ evolution post demutualization is consistently and significantly 
positive, except for 2001 and 2003, where the volume dropped 1,77% and 4,67%, 
accordingly. Therefore, the data is consistent with my hypothesis. Moreover, if we carefully 
analyse, in the moments prior to demutualization, the total number of listed companies 
decreases consistently every year, indicating that competition from other trading venues was 
eroding the exchanges’ gains. However, once demutualization occurs, the trend reverses, 
peaking in 2002, with an overall increase of 21,10%. This peak, in 2002, is resultant of the 
increase in foreign listings. Specifically looking at domestic and foreign listings, we see that 
the primary are constantly increasing throughout the period analysed, whilst the last are 
consistently decreasing, except for 2007. This exception may be the result of the BI’s 
takeover – it enhanced foreign competitiveness. Moreover, if we look at the underlying index, 
FTSE 100 (Exhibit I), we can see that it is rather constant, indicating that the markets’ 
movements were minor. This fact is relevant to my analysis in the sense that it proves the 
increase in total listings is related to demutualization and not to the markets’ movements. 
 
4.2.4 NYSE Euronext 
In the case of the NYSE, I cannot test for positive trends of the listed companies in the 
periods following demutualization, once the data is limited. However, I can and will analyse 
the evolution of the total listings in the moments prior to the structure change. The trend is 
rather obvious: steadily decreasing from 2000 until 2006 (year of demutualization). 
Specifically, the downhill tendency is a consequence of a decrease in domestic listings, as 
opposed to a reversed trend for the foreign listings. Speculating, we could say that the 
negative trend of the NYSE’s total listings is linked to the increasing total listings of the LSE, 
as both exchanges are global players and compete with each other. Therefore, this proves my 
hypothesis right, once competitive pressures are negatively affecting the total listings of the 
NYSE. Moreover, the underlying index, S&P 500 (Exhibit J), remains significantly constant 
throughout the analysis period, indicating that the evolutions of the NYSE’s listed companies 
are not linked to any market movements, but instead, to the structural evolution of the venue. 
 
4.2.5 Performances’ Conclusions 
Excepting the analysis of the ATHEX, I am enabled to conclude that in the moments prior to 
demutualization, competitive pressures from other venues continuously erode an exchanges’ 
revenues. Furthermore, I conclude that, with the introduction of a residual claimant, the 
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number of listed companies in the exchange continuously increases. This indicates that 
demutualization is value-enhancing, in the sense that the increase of listed companies also 
reflects a value-enhancement strategy. Moreover, to assure my findings are correct, I looked 
at the market movements and was then enabled to link the evolutions of listings to 
demutualization. 
 
4.3 Shareholders’ Structure Analysis 
In this section, I analyse a possible positive link between the increase of shareholders – 
creating more powerful minorities -, and better performances. Therefore, I analyse the growth 
of Institutional Holdings’ and Insiders Stakeholders, and relate these facts with the 
performance of the exchange. However, I did not manage to collect data from two different 
years for the HKEx and the ATHEX. Hence, I will only analyse the LSE and the NYSE 
Euronext., so that I can link the evolution of shareholders to the evolution of performances. 
Yet, in Exhibits K and L, I provide the reader with the punctual (2008) situation of 
shareholders in the HKEx and the ATHEX, for a mere informative motive. 
 
4.3.1 LSE 
Institutional Holdings' percentage of the LSE (2006)
Credit Suisse Asset Management (UK) Ltd.
Deutsche Asset Management Ltd. (UK)
Barclays Global Investors Ltd. (UK)
Legal & General Investment Management
Ltd.
Hermes Focus Asset Management Europe
SSgA Funds Management
UBS Securities /Market-Maker/
Scottish Widows Investment Partnership Ltd.
Goldman Sachs (US) /Market-Maker/
Baillie Gifford & Co Ltd.
State Street Global Advisors Ltd. (UK)
BNP Paribas Asset Management (UK) Ltd.
HSBC Investments (UK) Ltd.
The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc
Morley Fund Management
Thales Fund Management LLC
UBS Global Asset Management (UK) Ltd.
Horizon Asset Management, Inc.
Goldman Sachs & Co.
Morgan Stanley Investment Management
(UK)
 
Fig. 7 Institutional Holdings of the LSE, 2006 
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Institutional Holdings' percentage of the LSE (2008)
Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.
Legal & General Investment Management Ltd. (UK)
Cazenove Capital Management Limited
Aletti Gestielle SGR S.p.A.
Pioneer Investment Management, Inc.
Fidelity International Limited
Royal London Asset Management Ltd.
Liontrust Asset Management PLC
Union Investment Group
Barclays Global Investors (UK) Ltd.
ClearBridge Advisors
Duemme SGR
Morgan Stanley Investment Management Ltd. (UK)
Norges Bank
Lindsell Train Limited
State Street Global Advisors (UK) Ltd.
Others
 
Fig. 8 Institutional Holdings of the LSE, 2008 
As is clear in Figures 7 and 8, the number of institutional holdings in the LSE has grown 
significantly in two years time. Furthermore, and against my expectations, the major holdings 
have increased their share. However, if you closely look, the major holdings in 2006 are 
distinct to those in 2008, meaning that the composition of shareholders is mutating. Moreover, 
even though some major holdings increased their share of capital, the remaining capital is 
presently fractioned by a larger minority. Hence, the minorities are gaining importance and 
power in the LSE. Then again, insiders’ stakeholders (Exhibit M) assumed a different 
tendency: the majorities’ share of capital of the exchange is diminishing. Yet, similarly to 
institutional holdings, the minority stakeholders are gaining power in the exchange. 
 
Interestingly, the institutional ownership of the venue decreased from 82,9% (in 2006) to 
31,3% (in 2008). Moreover, the insider stakeholders’ percentage of the venue assumed a 
contrary drift; growing from 29,5% (in 2006) to 47,4% (in 2008), meaning that the insider 
stakeholders are gaining power inside the exchanges’ capital. In a sense, this may be value-
enhancing, once these shareholders, who also operate on the exchange, want to see their 
returns increase; meaning that operations need to be effective and efficient. 
 
As I presented earlier, the LSE has shown improving performances since the period of its 
demutualization. These positive performances are a result of better company policies – strictly 
aligned with value-enhancement. The natural question that follows is: why do performances 
improve with the structure change? The answer, reflected on my results, strictly relates to a 
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larger number of shareholders, whose interests are related to maximising the venues’ value. 
Hence, an increase in volume and diversity of shareholders has as a consequence, a dilution of 
the power of predecessor shareholders. In other words, with the increase of shareholders, it is 
harder for single members to implement self-interest policies into the exchange. The case of 
the LSE clearly shows the positive relationship between increasing shareholders and better 
performances; as shareholders increase, the performances of the exchange are improving.  
 
4.3.2 NYSE Euronext 
Institutional Holdings' percentage of the NYSE (2006)
Atticus Management LLC
Goldman Sachs Asset Management LP (US)
Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing LP
Horizon Asset Management, Inc.
Kinetics Asset Management, Inc.
LaBranche & Co.
Goldman Sachs & Co.
Columbia Management Advisors, Inc.
Gandhara Advisors Europe LLP
Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.
Others
 
Fig. 9 Institutional Holdings of the NYSE, 2006 
Institutional Holdings' percentage of the NYSE (2008)
Horizon Asset Management, Inc.
Barclays Global Investors, N.A.
State Street Global Advisors (US)
Legg Mason Capital Management, Inc.
AllianceBernstein L.P.
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
Vanguard Group, Inc.
General Atlantic LLC
J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc. (New
York)
LaBranche Structured Products, L.L.C.
Columbia Management Advisors, Inc.
Tremblant Capital Group
Goldman Sachs Clearing & Execution, L.P.
BNY Mellon Wealth Management
Northern Trust Investments, N.A.
Fred Alger Management, Inc.
TIAA-CREF
Analytic Investors, LLC
Barclays Global Investors (UK) Ltd.
Others
 
Fig. 10 Institutional Holdings of the NYSE, 2008 
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Even though the LSE’s analysis is a good barometer to test if the increase of shareholders is 
positively linked to improved performances, the NYSE’s case is much more objective, since 
the period studied is exactly when the exchange demutualized. 
 
In 2006 - period of demutualization -, the number of institutional holdings was much reduced, 
compared to 2008. Furthermore, there was not only an increase in holdings but, unlike the 
case of the LSE, the minorities increased and the major shareholders’ saw their share of 
capital diminished. This trend is also observed in the case of the insiders’ stakeholders 
(Exhibit N). 
 
Contrary to the case of the LSE, the institutional ownership share of the NYSE’s capital 
assumed an increase tendency, growing 22,5% in the period analysed. On the other hand, the 
insider stakeholders saw their share of the NYSE diminished; decreasing from 7,5% (in 
2006), to 0,61% (in 2008), meaning that the shareholders who too, operate on the exchange, 
saw their power within the venue diminished. This fact supports my hypothesis that a greater 
number of outsider shareholders is a good premise for better performances.     
 
Moreover, as seen in the previous financial analysis, the NYSE has an improving PO ratio 
from 2006 onwards – which indicates value-enhancement. Therefore, I can conclude that the 
increase in shareholders at the time of demutualization was one of the significant structural 
changes that resulted in better value-enhancement policies. Thus, in line with my conclusions 
for the LSE, the NYSE’s data too, shows that a larger number and variety of shareholders 
opens course for a better value-maximisation management, since the self-interest policies of 
sole members are diluted with the increase of shareholders.  
 
If we look at the cases of the HKEx and ATHEX (Exhibits L and K, accordingly), we 
continue to see the patterns identified in the cases of LSE and NYSE Euronext. In other 
words, the HKEx, which shows positive performances since the time of demutualization, has 
a diverse and bigger shareholder base. Contrarily, the ATHEX, which has a more limited 
shareholder composition, has worse performances. However, this analysis of the HKEx and 
ATHEX is not conclusive, since the data I was able to collect only refers to one fiscal year; 
inhibiting an analysis of the evolutional pattern. 
 
4.3.3 Conclusions concerning the Structure of Ownership 
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In conclusion, we clearly see that in the LSE and NYSE’s analysis, as the number of 
shareholders augments, the performances of the exchange also improve. In my opinion, this 
results from the fact that a broader shareholder base disables specific shareholders to 
implement policies in their self-interest. Thus, the shareholders are voting forth value-
maximisation, in order to promote their investment and, as a result, the performances of the 
exchanges are improving.   
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper I have investigated the benefits of demutualization. Up until approximately a 
decade ago, stock exchanges were structured as mutually owned cooperatives. Today, all of 
the 10 largest international exchanges in the world are demutualized venues. That is, their 
membership is distinct from their ownership. 
 
Due to a variety of reasons, but specially competitive and technological, exchanges around 
the globe are constantly converting into for-profit venues. Technology was the trigger for 
competition, in the sense that it was technology that came to compete with the traditional 
exchanges. Moreover, as discussed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Sillanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), with the emergence of technology, regulatory and national barriers were reformed 
and, hence, the exchanges’ markets became truly contestable – the incumbent monopolies 
could no longer enjoy the privilege of being a sole provider of the industry. As a result, the 
traditional cooperative venues had to adopt value-maximization strategies, in opposition to the 
self-interest policies implemented by single members. However, due to the structures’ 
conditions, exchanges were not being able to implement competitive strategies and, 
consequently, their revenues were eroding. The solution for the problem was demutualization. 
 
As seen throughout my analysis, it is obvious that demutualization is value-enhancing, in line 
with the arguments of Mendiola and O’Hara (2003). I conclude the process is value-
enhancing since, in the moments post structure change, the revenues are increasing, 
operational costs are decreasing, and the overall performances of the sample exchanges seem 
to be improving. This is clear with the increasing profitability from operations ratio, which 
shows the exchanges studied become more cost-efficient once demutualization is complete. 
Furthermore, strengthening this idea is the fact that (contrary to my predictions), the RoE 
increases; meaning that a greater return is being put forward to shareholders. This too, is an 
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indicator of value enhancement – it would be impossible for the RoE to increase if the 
performances of the exchange were not improving. 
 
On the other hand, as seen in cases presented, the effects of demutualization are not 
instantaneous. Moreover, demutualization can minimize the basis problems, but it does not 
constitute a solution. As seen in the case of the ATHEX, demutualization alone cannot solve 
the financial basis problems and, consequently, even after demutualization (2002), the 
exchange experiences a negative net-profit. 
 
I also conclude that demutualization is volume-enhancing. Furthermore, in the moments prior 
to demutualization, the levels of listed companies in the sample exchanges seem to experience 
a decrease. I believe this is a consequence of competitive pressures, as argued by Hazarika 
(2005). However, the ATHEX does not prove this pattern, which, in my opinion, results from 
a lack of competition. 
 
On the other hand, I also found a positive link between the number of shareholders (and its 
evolution), and the evolution of the exchanges’ performances. In the two cases studied (LSE 
and NYSE Euronext), it is clear that as the number of shareholders increase, the performances 
of the exchange improve. The explanation for this is simple: the majority loses power and, 
therefore, sole members can no longer impose a number of self-interest policies into the 
exchange; meaning that the minorities are now strong enough to implement for-exchange 
policies. As a result, the performance of the venue improves and, consequently, the value put 
forward to shareholders is greater; which is an optimal situation for the minorities, as their 
share of capital is minor. 
 
As shown by Ramos (2006b), I too conclude that demutualization is the initial strategy for a 
merger situation. In my analysis, 3 of the 4 sample exchanges merge with another exchange at 
the time of demutualization, meaning that demutualization could be the first phase for a 
merger process. In context, we could also agree (in relation with Ramos, 2006b) that, after 
undertaking demutualization, the exchanges go public in order to acquire other trading 
venues. This observation is pertinent, in the sense that 2 of the 4 sample exchanges analysed, 
went public and then acquired another exchange. The LSE acquired the BI and the NYSE 
merged with Euronext. However, in my opinion, these acquisitions are still in line with the 
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introduction of a residual claimant (or demutualization), in the sense that the acquisitions 
clearly promoted revenues – value-enhancement.  
 
Finally, I come to believe that this paper is interesting and relevant for the exchange 
environment in several ways. First, it produces an analysis that shows how demutualization is 
value-enhancing for the exchange. Secondly, it also confirms the previous conclusions of 
Hazarika (2005) and Ramos (2006b). However, in a future study, I believe I should analyse a 
greater number of exchanges and a longer period of data, in order to certify my results with a 
wider sample of exchanges, increasing further the reliability of my conclusions. Furthermore, 
I believe a future study would be interesting to cross-examine the relationship of variables, 
such as competition and acquisitions, in the sense that exchanges demutualize in order to 
promote value, which itself is eroded with competition. Therefore, if the exchange acquires 
another venue, this enhances its revenues and, consequently, it gains a competitive advantage.    
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Exhibit A 
This table presents a ranking of the worlds’ largest stock exchanges ordered by market 
capitalization - USD million dollars (years 2006 and 2007) 
Source: WFE Annual Report, 2007 
 
Rank Exchange Governance Regime USD mn end 2007 
USD mn end 
2006 
% Change  
in USD 
1 NYSE Group Publicly Listed 15.651 15.421 1,50% 
2 Tokyo Stock Exchange Private Limited 4.331 4.614 -6,10% 
3 Euronext Publicly Listed 4.223 3.713 13,70% 
4 Nasdaq Stock Market Publicly Listed 4.014 3.865 3,80% 
5 London Stock Exchange Publicly Listed 3.852 3.794 1,50% 
6 Shanghai Stock Exchange Publicly Listed 3.694 918 302,70% 
7 Hong Kong Exchanges Publicly Listed 2.654 1.715 54,80% 
8 TSX Group Publicly Listed 2.187 1.701 28,60% 
9 Deutsche Börse Publicly Listed 2.105 1.638 28,60% 
10 Bombay Stock Exchange Publicly Listed 1.819 819 122,10% 
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Exhibit B 
These tables present the synthesized Cash Flow, Balance Sheet and Financial indicators of the ATHEX. Years 1998 to 2007. Source: WFE. 
 
  
Year 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Cash Flow 
            
Total Revenue 70,65 216,54 154,41 78,90 51,01 62,24 60,86 73,83 118,27 161,48 
Gross Profit 55,96 190,06 124,38 47,41 22,75 38,19 55,42 70,02 109,43 140,83 
Total Operating Expense 23,47 50,66 60,12 63,07 49,60 22,96 40,86 35,19 36,54 44,57 
Operating Income 47,18 165,88 94,29 15,82 1,42 39,28 20,00 38,64 81,73 116,92 
Net Income Before Taxes 61,95 197,69 119,19 28,80 -20,12 46,81 46,90 43,38 86,06 123,29 
Net Income After Taxes 40,40 121,06 119,17 28,80 -20,12 46,81 33,61 27,12 58,08 91,03 
Net Income 29,51 81,29 87,26 25,58 -20,22 43,79 33,59 27,10 58,07 91,03 
              
Balance Sheet 
            
Total Assets 154,47 466,44 422,06 340,91 259,36 314,13 366,24 234,96 208,84 241,27 
Total Debt 0,01 0,15 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Total Liabilities 82,12 339,41 51,08 92,93 25,90 45,18 33,74 33,06 54,30 52,10 
Total Equity 72,35 127,03 370,98 247,98 233,46 268,96 332,51 201,90 154,53 189,17 
Total Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity 154,47 466,44 422,06 340,90 259,36 314,13 366,24 234,96 208,84 241,27 
Note: Standardised in millions of €uros            
           
 
FISCAL YEAR 
Indicator 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
RoA (Oper. Profit / Total Assets) 30,54% 35,56% 22,34% 4,64% 0,55% 12,50% 5,46% 16,45% 39,14% 48,46% 
RoE (Net Profit / Equity)  40,79% 63,99% 23,52% 10,32% -8,66% 16,28% 10,10% 13,42% 37,58% 48,12% 
Profitability from operations (Oper. Profit / Total Revenue) 66,78% 76,60% 61,06% 20,05% 2,78% 63,11% 32,86% 52,34% 69,10% 72,41% 
Asset Turnover (Total Revenues / Total Assets) 45,74% 46,42% 36,58% 23,14% 19,67% 19,81% 16,62% 31,42% 56,63% 66,93% 
Financial Leverage (Tot. Liabilities/ Total Assets) 53,16% 72,77% 12,10% 27,26% 9,99% 14,38% 9,21% 14,07% 26,00% 21,59% 
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Exhibit C 
These tables present the synthesized Cash Flow, Balance Sheet and Financial indicators of the HKEx. Years 1999 to 2007. Source: WFE. 
 
  
Year 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Cash Flow 
          
Total Revenue 1.814,98 2.312,20 2.068,26 1.808,09 2.019,83 2.393,94 2.694,07 4.146,92 8.390,47 
Gross Profit 1.202,17 1.732,73 1.405,85 1.338,33 1.549,87 1.976,35 2.172,93 3.247,50 6.658,23 
Total Operating Expense 1.257,82 1.332,76 1.245,81 1.158,52 1.215,09 1.143,41 1.127,05 1.183,45 1.405,98 
Operating Income 557,16 979,45 822,45 649,57 804,74 1.250,53 1.567,02 2.963,47 6.984,49 
Net Income Before Taxes 557,16 979,45 822,45 649,57 804,74 1.250,53 1.567,02 2.963,47 7.190,81 
Net Income After Taxes 520,67 873,65 740,43 588,51 692,69 1.056,88 1.339,56 2.518,57 6.169,28 
Net Income 520,67 873,65 740,43 588,51 692,69 1.056,88 1.339,56 2.518,57 6.169,28 
            
Balance Sheet 
          
Total Assets 14.460,90 14.169,00 13.745,01 14.035,47 19.807,98 21.443,40 22.930,92 40.464,41 87.944,19 
Total Debt 204,43 0,00 46,45 49,46 50,29 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Total Liabilities 10.344,34 9.290,04 8.509,60 8.539,08 14.193,85 17.411,17 18.593,45 35.206,82 79.566,84 
Total Equity 4.116,56 4.878,96 5.235,41 5.496,39 5.614,13 4.032,23 4.337,47 5.257,59 8.377,35 
Total Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity 14.460,90 14.169,00 13.745,01 14.035,47 19.807,98 21.443,40 22.930,92 40.464,41 87.944,19 
Note: Standardised in millions of HKD          
          
 
FISCAL YEAR 
Indicator 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
RoA (Oper. Profit / Total Assets) 3,85% 6,91% 5,98% 4,63% 4,06% 5,83% 6,83% 7,32% 7,94% 
RoE (Net Profit / Equity)  12,65% 17,91% 14,14% 10,71% 12,34% 26,21% 30,88% 47,90% 73,64% 
Profitability from operations (Oper. Profit / Total Revenue) 30,70% 42,36% 39,77% 35,93% 39,84% 52,24% 58,17% 71,46% 83,24% 
Asset Turnover (Total Revenues / Total Assets) 12,55% 16,32% 15,05% 12,88% 10,20% 11,16% 11,75% 10,25% 9,54% 
Financial Leverage (Tot. Liabilities/ Total Assets) 71,53% 65,57% 61,91% 60,84% 71,66% 81,20% 81,08% 87,01% 90,47% 
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Exhibit D 
These tables present the synthesized Cash Flow, Balance Sheet and Financial indicators of the LSE. Years 1997 to 2007. Source: WFE. 
 
 
Year 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Income Statement 
             
Total Revenue 126,70 149,80 171,20 188,40 206,60 225,90 237,10 244,40 297,50 349,60 546,40 
Gross Profit 30,00 149,80 171,20 188,40 206,60 225,90 237,10 84,60 120,10 185,60 546,40 
Total Operating Expense 97,60 137,30 129,30 166,20 139,70 155,90 155,80 159,90 212,10 175,40 288,90 
Operating Income 29,10 12,50 41,90 22,20 66,90 70,00 81,30 84,50 85,40 174,20 257,50 
Net Income Before Taxes 39,70 22,30 48,50 30,40 75,20 79,50 88,80 92,20 93,50 161,50 227,00 
Net Income After Taxes 28,10 14,70 32,10 15,20 49,90 52,70 63,10 64,50 66,80 110,60 173,00 
Net Income 28,10 14,70 32,10 15,20 49,90 52,70 63,40 65,00 70,70 109,60 168,30 
               
Balance Sheet              
Total Assets 322,20 352,20 365,20 325,40 365,70 427,30 483,50 360,40 413,70 267,10 19.564,20 
Total Debt 30,00 30,00 30,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,90 3,30 1,10 420,10 17.999,80 
Total Liabilities 127,30 126,20 120,10 83,40 84,40 105,60 117,80 124,10 124,90 619,60 18.396,50 
Total Equity 194,90 226,00 245,10 242,00 281,30 321,70 365,70 236,30 288,80 -352,50 1.167,70 
Total Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity 322,20 352,20 365,20 325,40 365,70 427,30 483,50 360,40 413,70 267,10 19.564,20 
Note: Standardised in millions of Pound Sterling            
            
 
FISCAL YEAR 
Indicator 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
RoA (Oper. Profit / Total Assets) 9,03% 3,55% 11,47% 6,82% 18,29% 16,38% 16,81% 23,45% 20,64% 65,22% 1,32% 
RoE (Net Profit / Equity)  14,42% 6,50% 13,10% 6,28% 17,74% 16,38% 17,34% 27,51% 24,48% -31,09% 14,41% 
Profitability from operations (Oper. Profit / Total Revenue) 22,97% 8,34% 24,47% 11,78% 32,38% 30,99% 34,29% 34,57% 28,71% 49,83% 47,13% 
Asset Turnover (Total Revenues / Total Assets) 39,32% 42,53% 46,88% 57,90% 56,49% 52,87% 49,04% 67,81% 71,91% 130,89% 2,79% 
Financial Leverage (Tot. Liabilities/ Total Assets) 39,51% 35,83% 32,89% 25,63% 23,08% 24,71% 24,36% 34,43% 30,19% 231,97% 94,03% 
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Exhibit E 
These tables present the synthesized Cash Flow, Balance Sheet and Financial indicators of the NYSE Euronext. Years 2002 to 2007. Source: 
WFE. 
 
 
Year 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Cash Flow 
        
Total Revenue 1.369,79 1.523,20 1.405,46 1.633,00 2.376,00 4.158,00 
Gross Profit 260,13 295,91 253,61 276,00 576,00 1.510,00 
Total Operating Expense 1312,14 1416,23 1392,53 1589 2142 3249 
Operating Income 57,65 106,97 12,94 44,00 234,00 909,00 
Net Income Before Taxes 57,65 106,97 43,30 91,00 329,00 921,00 
Net Income After Taxes 38,94 61,73 31,16 43,00 208,00 668,00 
Net Income 36,61 60,46 30,16 41,00 205,00 643,00 
          
Balance Sheet 
        
Total Assets - 2.009,20 1.982,25 2.204,15 3.466,00 16.618,00 
Total Debt - 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2.713,00 
Total Liabilities - 1.280,85 1.214,78 1.405,02 1.797,00 7.234,00 
Total Equity - 728,35 767,47 799,13 1.669,00 9.384,00 
Total Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity - 2009,2 1982,25 2204,15 3466 16618 
Note: Standardised in millions of USD       
       
 
FISCAL YEAR 
Indicator 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
RoA (Oper. Profit / Total Assets) 0,00% 5,32% 0,65% 2,00% 6,75% 5,47% 
RoE (Net Profit / Equity)  0,00% 8,30% 3,93% 5,13% 12,28% 6,85% 
Profitability from operations (Oper. Profit / Total 
Revenue) 4,21% 7,02% 0,92% 2,69% 9,85% 21,86% 
Asset Turnover (Total Revenues / Total Assets) 0,00% 75,81% 70,90% 74,09% 68,55% 25,02% 
Financial Leverage (Tot. Liabilities/ Total Assets) 0,00% 63,75% 61,28% 63,74% 51,85% 43,53% 
 
 
Dissertation Jaime Homem de Sá 
Corporate Governance- Demutualization of stock exchanges 
 57 
Exhibit F 
These tables present the Total, Domestic and Foreign listings in each of the sample 
exchanges, from 1996 through to 2007. Source: WFE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domestic Listings 
  
Exchange 
  NYSE Group % Change Athens Exchange % Change London SE % Change Hong Kong Exchanges % Change 
1996 2.172 - 200 - 2.041 - 561 - 
1997 2.271 4,56% 210 5,00% 2.046 0,24% 638 13,73% 
1998 2.278 0,31% 229 9,05% 1.957 -4,35% 665 4,23% 
1999 2.620 15,01% 262 14,41% 1.826 -6,69% 695 4,51% 
2000 2.035 -22,33% 309 17,94% 1.926 5,48% 779 12,09% 
2001 1.939 -4,72% 313 1,29% 1.923 -0,16% 857 10,01% 
2002 1.894 -2,32% 323 3,19% 2.405 25,07% 968 12,95% 
2003 1.842 -2,75% 331 2,48% 2.311 -3,91% 1.027 6,10% 
2004 1.834 -0,43% 339 2,42% 2.486 7,57% 1.086 5,74% 
2005 1.818 -0,87% 302 -10,91% 2.757 10,90% 1.126 3,68% 
2006 1.829 0,61% 288 -4,64% 2.913 5,66% 1.165 3,46% 
2007 1.876 2,57% 280 -2,78% 2.588 -11,16% 1.232 5,75% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Listings 
  
Exchange 
  NYSE Group % Change Athens Exchange % Change London SE % Change Hong Kong Exchanges % Change 
1996 2.476 - 200 - 2.494 - 583 - 
1997 2.626 6,06% 210 5,00% 2.513 0,76% 658 12,86% 
1998 2.670 1,68% 229 9,05% 2.423 -3,58% 680 3,34% 
1999 3.025 13,30% 262 14,41% 2.274 -6,15% 708 4,12% 
2000 2.468 -18,41% 310 18,32% 2.374 4,40% 790 11,58% 
2001 2.400 -2,76% 314 1,29% 2.332 -1,77% 867 9,75% 
2002 2.366 -1,42% 324 3,18% 2.824 21,10% 978 12,80% 
2003 2.308 -2,45% 332 2,47% 2.692 -4,67% 1.037 6,03% 
2004 2.293 -0,65% 341 2,71% 2.837 5,39% 1.096 5,69% 
2005 2.270 -1,00% 304 -10,85% 3.091 8,95% 1.135 3,56% 
2006 2.280 0,44% 290 -4,61% 3.256 5,34% 1.173 3,35% 
2007 2.297 0,75% 283 -2,41% 3.307 1,57% 1.241 5,80% 
Dissertation Jaime Homem de Sá 
Corporate Governance- Demutualization of stock exchanges 
 58 
Exhibit F (Cont.) 
 
 
 
Foreign Listings 
  
Exchange 
  NYSE Group % Change Athens Exchange % Change London SE % Change Hong Kong Exchanges % Change 
1996 304 - 0 - 453 - 22 - 
1997 355 16,78% 0 - 467 3,09% 20 -9,09% 
1998 392 10,42% 0 - 466 -0,21% 15 -25,00% 
1999 405 3,32% 0 - 448 -3,86% 13 -13,33% 
2000 433 6,91% 1 100,00% 448 0,00% 11 -15,38% 
2001 461 6,47% 1 0,00% 409 -8,71% 10 -9,09% 
2002 472 2,39% 1 0,00% 419 2,44% 10 0,00% 
2003 466 -1,27% 1 0,00% 381 -9,07% 10 0,00% 
2004 459 -1,50% 2 100,00% 351 -7,87% 10 0,00% 
2005 452 -1,53% 2 0,00% 334 -4,84% 9 -10,00% 
2006 451 -0,22% 2 0,00% 343 2,69% 8 -11,11% 
2007 421 -6,65% 3 50,00% 719 109,62% 9 12,50% 
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Exhibit G 
This graph shows the tendencies of the EXAE index (giving us an idea of the markets’ 
movements), compared to the ATHEX’s price quotations’ movements. Years 2005 to 2009. 
Source: Reuters Knowledge 
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Exhibit H 
This graph shows the tendencies of the index Hang Seng (giving us an idea of the markets’ 
movements), compared to the HKEx’s price quotations’ movements. Years 2005 to 2009. 
Source: Reuters Knowledge 
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Exhibit I 
This graph shows the tendencies of the index FTSE 100 (giving us an idea of the markets’ 
movements), compared to the LSE’s price quotations’ movements. Years 2005 to 2009. 
Source: Reuters Knowledge 
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Exhibit J 
This graph shows the tendencies of the index S&P 500 (giving us an idea of the markets’ 
movements), compared to the NYSE Euronext’s price quotations’ movements. Years 2005 to 
2009. Source: Reuters Knowledge 
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Exhibit K 
These graphs show the respective compositions of Institutional Holdings and Insiders 
Stakeholders, of the ATHEX, in 2008. Source: Reuters Knowledge. 
Institutional Holdings' percentage of the ASE (2008)
Fidelity Management & Research
Evergreen Investment Management Company, LLC
NBG Asset Management Mutual Funds Management
Compa
Insight Investment Management (Global) Limited
Crédit Agricole Asset Management S.A.
DWS Investment GmbH
EFG Mutual Fund Management Co. Aedak
Artisan Partners Limited Partnership
Threadneedle Asset Management Ltd.
AIG Global Investment Corp. (Europe) Ltd.
Franklin Mutual Advisers, LLC
Argonaut Capital Partners LLP
Cominvest Asset Management GmbH
State Street Global Advisors (France) S.A.
Allianz Nederland Asset Management B.V.
Deutsche Asset Management Investmentgesellschaft
m
Pension Mutual Fund Management Company S.A.
Alpha Asset Management A.E.D.A.K.
INKA-Internationale Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH
Baring Asset Management Ltd.
Others
 
 
Insiders Stakeholders' percentage of the ASE (2008)
Geduld E E
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Exhibit L 
These graphs show the respective compositions of Institutional Holdings and Insiders 
Stakeholders, of the HKEx, in 2008. Source: Reuters Knowledge. 
Institutional Holdings' percentage of the HKEx (2008)
Thornburg Investment Management, Inc.
Barclays Global Investors, N.A.
Janus Capital Management LLC
Schroder Investment Management Ltd. (SIM)
FIL Investment Management (Hong Kong) Limited
Baring Asset Management Asia Ltd.
State Street Global Advisors Asia Ltd.
Vanguard Group, Inc.
TIAA-CREF
Hang Seng Investment Management Ltd.
JF Asset Management (HK) Ltd.
Invesco Hong Kong Limited
JPMorgan Asset Management U.K. Limited
DWS Investment GmbH
Columbia Wanger Asset Management, L.P.
Norges Bank
Lazard Asset Management, L.L.C.
Prudential Asset Management (HK) Ltd.
Baillie Gifford & Co.
Union Investment Group
Henderson Global Investors Ltd.
Sumitomo Mitsui Asset Management Company, Limited
Mastholm Asset Management, L.L.C.
Others
 
 
Insiders Stakeholders' percentage of the HKEx (2008)
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administra
Chow (Man Yiu Paul)
Geduld E E
Strickland (John Estmond)
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Exhibit M 
These graphs show the composition of the Insiders Stakeholders of the LSE, in 2006 and 
2008, respectively. Source: Reuters Knowledge. 
Insiders Stakeholders' percentage of the LSE (2006)
The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc.
Castlerigg Master Investments Ltd.
SPENCER MICHAEL
Royce & Associates
FURSE CLARA
 
 
Insiders Stakeholders' percentage of the LSE (2008)
Borse Dubai, Ltd.
Qatar Investment Authority
Unicredito Italiano S.p.A
NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc
London Stock Exchange Employee Benefit
Trust
Unione di Banche Italiane s.c.p.a.
Others
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Exhibit N 
The graphs show the composition of the Insiders Stakeholders of the NYSE Euronext, in 2006 
and 2008, respectively. Source: Reuters Knowledge. 
Insiders Stakeholders' percentage of the NYSE (2006)
General Atlantic LLC
PUTNAM GERALD D
Others
 
Insiders Stakeholders' percentage of the NYSE (2008)
Putnam (Gerald D)
Susquehanna International Group,
LLP
Théodore (Jean-Francois)
Harry (Serge)
BNP Paribas Arbitrage SA
KBC Group NV
Others
 
 
